John C Mitchell (Computer Science Department, Stanford University)
Computationally Sound Formal Logic for Network Security Protocols [ppt]
A cryptographically sound formal logic makes it possible to prove security
properties of network protocols without explicitly reasoning about
probability,
asymptotic complexity, or the actions of a malicious attacker. The approach
rests on a probabilistic, polynomial-time semantics for a protocol security
logic that was originally developed using nondeterministic symbolic
semantics.
This talk will present the main features of the proof system, its
interpretation,
and example proofs for known protocols. We will also discuss ways
in which the computational semantics leads to different reasoning methods
than the coarser symbolic semantics. One significant difference between
the symbolic and computational settings stems from the computational
difference
Between efficiently recognizing and efficiently producing a value.
Among our more recent developments are a compositional
method for proving cryptographically sound properties of key exchange
protocols, and some work on secrecy properties that illustrates the
computational interpretation of inductive properties of protocol roles.
Joint work with Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, Arnab Roy, Vitaly Shmatikov,
Mathieu Turuani, and Bogdan Warinschi.