# ALASCA: Reasoning in Quantified Linear Arithmetic (Extended Version) 

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# ALASCA: Reasoning in Quantified Linear Arithmetic (Extended Version) 

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#### Abstract

Automated reasoning is routinely used in the rigorous construction and analysis of complex systems. Among different theories, arithmetic stands out as one of the most frequently used and at the same time one of the most challenging in the presence of quantifiers and uninterpreted function symbols. First-order theorem provers perform very well on quantified problems due to the efficient superposition calculus, but support for arithmetic reasoning is limited to heuristic axioms. In this paper, we introduce the AlASCA calculus that lifts superposition reasoning to the linear arithmetic domain. We show that Alasca is both sound and complete with respect to an axiomatisation of linear arithmetic. We implemented and evaluated Alasca using the Vampire theorem prover, solving many more challenging problems compared to state-of-the-art reasoners.

This paper is an extended version of the paper "ALASCA: Reasoning in Quantified Linear Arithmetic" published at TACAS 2023, written by the same set of the authors. In this extended version we provide the formal proofs of the results from our TACAS 2023 paper.


Keywords: Automated Reasoning • Linear Arithmetic • SMT • Quantified First-Order Logic • Theorem Proving

## 1 Introduction

Automated reasoning is undergoing a rapid development thanks to its successful use, for example, in mathematical theory formalisation [15], formal verification [16] and web security [13]. The use of automated reasoning in these areas is mostly driven by the application of SMT solving for quantifier-free formulas [6, 12, 28]. However, there exist many use case scenarios, such as expressing arithmetic operations over memory allocation and financial transactions [1, 18, 20, 31], which require complex first-order quantification. SMT solvers handle quantifiers using heuristic instantiation in domain-specific model construction [10, 27, 29, 35]. While being incomplete in most cases, instantiation requires instances to be produced to perform reasoning, which can lead to an explosion in work required for quantifier-heavy problems. What is rather needed to address the above use cases
is a reasoning approach able to handle both theories and complex applications of quantifiers. Our work tackles this challenge and designs a practical, low-cost methodology for proving first-order quantified linear arithmetic properties.

The problem of combining quantifiers with theories, and especially with arithmetic, is recognised as a major challenge in both SMT and first-order proving communities. In this paper we focus on first-order, i.e. quantified, reasoning with linear arithmetic and uninterpreted functions. In [25], it is shown that the validity problem for first-order reasoning with linear arithmetic and uninterpreted functions is $\Pi_{1}^{1}$-complete even when quantifiers are restricted to non-theory sorts. Therefore, there is no sound and complete calculus for this logic.

Quantified Reasoning in Linear Arithmetic - Related Works. In practice, there are two classes of methods of reasoning in first-order theory reasoning, and in particular with linear real arithmetic. SMT solvers use instance-based methods, where they repeatedly generate ground, that is quantifier-free, instances of quantified formulas and use decision procedures to check satisfiability of the resulting set of ground formulas [10, 27, 35]. Superposition-based first-order theorem provers use saturation algorithms [14, 26, 36]. In essense, they start with an initial set of clauses obtained by preprocessing the input formulas (initial search space) and repeatedly apply inference rules (such as superposition) to clauses in the search space, adding their (generally, non-ground) consequences to the search space. These two classes of methods are very different in nature and complement each other.

The superposition calculus $[4,30]$ is a refutationally complete calculus for firstorder logic with equality that is used by modern first-order provers, for example, Vampire [26], E [36], iProver [17] and Zipperposition [14]. There have been a number of practical extensions to this calculus for reasoning in first-order theories, in particular for linear arithmetic [9,11, 23]. Superposition theorem provers have become efficient and powerful on theory reasoning after the introduction of the AVATAR architecture [32, 37], which allows generated ground clauses to be passed to SMT solvers. Yet, superposition theorem provers have a major source of inefficiency. To work with theories, one has to add theory axioms, for example the transitivity of inequality $\forall x \forall y \forall z(x \leq y \wedge y \leq z \rightarrow x \leq z)$. In clausal form, this formula becomes $\neg x \leq y \vee \neg y \leq z \vee x \leq z$ where $\neg x \leq y$ can be resolved against every clause in which an inequality literal $s \leq t$ is selected. This, with other prolific theory axioms, results in a very significant growth of the search space. Note that SMT solvers do not use and do not need such theory axioms.

A natural solution is to try to eliminate some theory axioms, but this is notoriously difficult both in theory and in practice. In [25], the Lasca calculus was proposed, which replaced several theory axioms of linear arithmetic, including transitivity of inequality, by a new inference rule inspired by Fourier-Motzkin elimination and some additional rules. LASCA was shown to be complete for the ground case. But, after 15 years, LASCA is still not implemented, due to its complexity and lack of clear treatment for the non-ground case. As we argue in Sect. 5 , lifting Lasca to the non-ground setting is nearly impossible as a non-ground extension of the underlining ordering is missing in [25].

Lifting Lasca to Alasca- Our contributions. In this paper we introduce a new non-ground version of Lasca, which we call Abstracting Lasca (Alasca). Our Alasca calculus comes with new abstraction mechanisms (Sect. 4), inference rules and orderings (Sect. 5), which all together are proved to yield a sound and complete approach with respect to a natural partial axiomatisation of linear arithmetic (Theorem 5). In a nutshell, we make Alasca both work and scale by introducing (i) a novel variable elimination rule within saturation-based proof search (Fig. 6); (ii) an analogue of unification with abstraction [33] needed for non-ground reasoning (Sect. 4); and (iii) a new non-ground ordering and powerful background theory for unification, which is not restricted to arithmetic but can be used with arbitrary theories (Sect. 5). As a result, Alasca improves [25] by ground modifications and lifting of LASCA in a finitary way, and complements [3, 39] with variable elimination rules that are competible with standard saturation algorithms. We also demonstrate the practicality and efficiency of Alasca (Sect. 6). To this end, we implemented Alasca in Vampire and show that it solves overall more problems than existing theorem provers.

## 2 Motivating Example

Consider the following mathematical property:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall x, y \cdot(f(2 x, y)>2 x+y \vee f(x+1, y)>x+2 y) \rightarrow \forall x \cdot \exists y \cdot f(2, y)>x \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $f$ is an uninterpreted function. While property (1) holds, deriving its validity is hard for state-of-the-art reasoners: only veriT [2] can solve it. Despite its seeming simplicity, this problem requires non-trivial handling of quantifiers and arithmetic. Namely, one would need to unify (modulo theory) the terms $2 x$ and $x+1$ (which can be done by instantiating $x$ with 1 ) and then derive $f(2, y)>2+y \vee f(2, y)>1+2 y$. Further, one also needs to prove that $f(2, y)$ is always greater than the minimum of $2+y$ and $1+2 y$, for arbitrary $y$.

Vampire with Alasca finds a remarkably short proof as shown in Fig. 1. To prove (1) its negation is shown unsatisfiable by first negating and translating into clausal form (by using skolemization and normalisation, which shifts arithmetic terms to be compared to 0), as listed in lines $1-4$. Next a lower bound for $f(2 x, y)$ is established: In line 5 , using our new inequality factoring (IF) rule with unification with abstraction (see Fig. 5), the constraint $2 x \not \approx x+1$ is introduced, and establishing thereby that if $2 x \approx 1+x$ and $y+2 x \leq 2 y+x$, then $f(2 x, y)>2 x+y$. After further normalisation, the inequalities $s k \geq f(2, y)$ and $f(2 x, y)>2 x+y$ are used to derive $s k>2 x+y$ in line 7 , using the Fourier-Motzkin Elimination rule (FM), while still keeping track of the constraint $2 x \not \approx x+1$. By applying the Variable Elimination rule (VE) twice, the empty clause $\square$ is derived in line 10 , showing the unsatisfiability of the negation of (1).

The key steps in the proof (and the reason why it was found in a short time) are: (1) the use of the theory rules (FM), and (IF); (2) the use of the new variable elimination rule (VE), and finally, a consistent use of unification with abstraction. These rules give a significant reduction compared to the number of steps required

| 1. | $f(2 x, y)>2 x+y \vee f(x+1, y)>x+2 y$ | Hypothesis |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2. $\neg f(2, y)>s k$ | Skolemized, Neg. Conj. |  |
| 3. $f(2 x, y)-2 x-y>0 \vee f(x+1, y)-x-2 y>0$ | Normalisation 1 |  |
| 4. $-f(2, y)+s k \geq 0$ | Normalisation 2 |  |
| 5. $f(2 x, y)-2 x-y>0 \vee y+2 x-2 y-x>0 \vee 2 x \not \approx x+1$ (IF) 3 |  |  |
| 6. $f(2 x, y)-2 x-y>0 \vee x-y>0 \vee 0 \not \approx x-1$ | Normalisation 5 |  |
| 7. $-2 x-y+s k>0 \vee x-y>0 \vee 0 \not \approx x-1 \vee 2 x \not \approx 2$ | (FM) 6,4 |  |
| 8. $-2 x-y+s k>0 \vee x-y>0 \vee 0 \not \approx x-1$ | Normalisation 7 |  |
| 9. $0 \not \approx x-1$ | (VE) 8 |  |
| 10. $\square$ | (VE) 9 |  |

Fig. 1. A refutational proof using the calculus introduced in this paper. Variables $x, y$ are implicitly universally quantified, and $s k$ is an uninterpreted constant.
using theory axioms. In particular, not using (FM) would require the use of transitivity and generation of several intermediate clauses. As well as shortening the proof, we eliminate the fatal impact on proof search from generating a large number of irrellevant formulas from theory axioms.

Indeed, such short proofs are also found quickly. Similar our previous example, $\forall x, y .(f(g(x)+g(a), y)>2 x+y \vee f(2 g(x), y)>x+2 y) \rightarrow \exists k . \forall x \exists z . f(2 g(k), z)>x$ has a short proof of 7 steps, excluding CNF transformation and normalisation steps, found by Vampire with Alasca. This proof was found in almost no time (only 37 clauses were generated) but cannot be solved by any other solver. This shows the power of the calculus.

## 3 Background and Notation

Multi-Sorted First-Order Logic. We assume familiarity with standard first-order logic with equality, with all standard boolean connectives and quantifiers in the language. We consider a multi-sorted first-order language, with sorts $\tau_{\mathbb{Q}}, \tau_{1}, \ldots, \tau_{n}$. The sort $\tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$ is the sort of rationals, whereas $\tau_{1}, \ldots, \tau_{n}$ are uninterpreted sorts. We write $\approx_{\tau}$ for the equality predicate of $\tau$. We denote the set of all terms as $\mathbf{T}$, variables as $\mathbf{V}$, and literals as $\mathbf{L}$. Throughout this paper, we denote terms by $s, t, u$, variables by $x, y, z$, function symbols by $f, g, h$, all possibly with indices. Given a term $t$ such that $t$ is $f(\ldots)$, we write $\operatorname{sym}(t)$ for $f$, referring that $f$ is the top level symbol of $t$. We write $t: \tau$ to denote that $t$ is a term of sort $\tau$. A term, or literal is called ground, when it does not contain any variables. We refer to the sets of all ground terms, and literals as $\mathbf{T}^{\theta}$, and $\mathbf{L}^{\theta}$ respectively.

We denote predicates by $P, Q$, literals by $L$, clauses by $C, D$, formulas by $F, G$, and sets of formulas (axioms) by $\mathcal{E}$, possibly with indices. We write $F \models G$ to denote that whenever $F$ holds in a model, then $G$ does as well. We call a function (similarly, for predicates) $f$ uninterpreted wrt some set of equations $\mathcal{E}$ if whenever $\mathcal{E} \models f\left(s_{1} \ldots s_{n}\right) \approx f\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)$, then $\mathcal{E} \models s_{1} \approx t_{1} \wedge \ldots \wedge s_{n} \approx t_{n}$. A function $f$ is interpreted wrt $\mathcal{E}$ if it is not uninterpreted.

Rational Sort. We assume the signature contains a countable set of unary functions $k: \tau_{\mathbb{Q}} \mapsto \tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$ for every $k \in \mathbb{Q}$ and refer to $k$ as numeral multiplications. In addition, the signature is assumed to also contain a constant $1: \tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$, a function $+: \tau_{\mathbb{Q}} \times \tau_{\mathbb{Q}} \mapsto \tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$, and predicate symbols $>, \geq: \mathbf{P}\left(\tau_{\mathbb{Q}} \times \tau_{\mathbb{Q}}\right)$, as well as an arbitrary number of other function symbols. For every numeral multiplication $k \in \mathbb{Q} \backslash\{1\}$, we simply write $k$ to denote the term $k(1)$ obtained by the numeral multiplication $k$ applied to 1 ; in these cases, we refer to $k$ as numerals. Throughout this paper, we use $j, k, l$ to denote numerals, or numeral multiplications, possibly with indices.

We write $-t$ to denote the term $-1(t)$. If $j, k$ are two numeral multiplications, by $(j k)$ and $(j+k)$ we denote the numeral multiplication that corresponds to the result of multiplying and adding the rationals/numerals $j$ and $k$, respectively. For applications of numeral multiplications $j(t)$ we may omit the parenthesis and write $j t$ instead. If we write $+k$, or $-k$ for some numeral $k$, we assume $k$ itself is positive. We write $\pm$ (and $\mp$ ) to denote either of the symbols + or (and respectively - or + ). For $q \in \mathbb{Q}$ we define $\operatorname{sign}(q)$ to be 1 if $q>0,-1$ if $q<0$, and 0 otherwise. We call,$+ \geq,>, 1$, and the numeral multiplications the $\mathbb{Q}$ symbols. Finally, an atomic term is either a logical variable, or the term 1, or a term whose top level function symbol is not a $\mathbb{Q}$ symbol.

A $\mathbb{Q}$-model interprets the sort $\tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$ as $\mathbb{Q}$, and all $\mathbb{Q}$ symbols as their corresponding functions/predicates on $\mathbb{Q}$. We write $\mathbb{Q} \models C$ iff for every $\mathbb{Q}$-model $M, M \models C$ holds. If $\mathcal{E}$ is a set of formulas, we call a model $M$ a $\mathcal{E}$-model if $M \models \mathcal{E}$.

Term Orderings. Let $\equiv$ be some equivalence relation. Then we say that $s$ is a subterm of $t$ wrt $\equiv\left(s \unlhd_{\equiv t)}\right.$ if $s \equiv t$, or $t \equiv f\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)$ and $s \unlhd t_{i}$ for some $i$. We say that $s$ is a strict subterm of $t$ wrt $\equiv(s \triangleleft \equiv t)$ if $s \unlhd_{\equiv} t$ and $s \neq t$. We say $s$ is a subterm of $t(s \unlhd t)$ if $s \unlhd_{=} t$, and $s$ is a strict subterm of $t(s \triangleleft t)$ if $s \triangleleft=t$. We write $u[s]$ to denote that $s$ is a subterm of $u$. That is, $s \unlhd u$; similar notation will also be used for literals $L[s]$ and clauses $C[s]$. We denote by $u[s \mapsto t]$ the term resulting from replacing all subterms $s$ of $u$ by $t$.

Multisets (of term, literals) are denoted with $\{\ldots\}$. For a multiset $S$ and natural number $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we define $0 * S=\emptyset$, and $n * S=(n-1 * S) \cup S$ for $n>0$.

Let $\prec$ be a relation and $\equiv$ be an equivalence relation. By $\prec$ mul we denote the multiset extension of $\prec$, defined as the smallest relation satisfying $M \cup$ $\left\{s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}\right\} \prec \underset{\equiv}{\text { mul }} N \cup\left\{t \dot{\}}\right.$, where $M \equiv N, n \geq 0$, and $s_{i} \prec t$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. For $n, m \in \mathbb{N}$, by $\prec \stackrel{\text { wmul }}{\equiv}$ we denote the weighted multiset extension, defined by $\left\langle\frac{1}{n}, S\right\rangle \prec \stackrel{\text { wmul }}{\equiv}\left\langle\frac{1}{m}, T\right\rangle$ iff $m * S \prec{ }_{\equiv}^{\text {mul }} n * T$. We omit the equivalence relation $\equiv$ if it is clear in the context.

Let $\prec$ be a relation and $\equiv$ be an equivalence relation. By $\prec \stackrel{\text { lex }}{=}$ we denote the lexicographic extension of $\prec$, written as $\left\langle s_{1} \ldots s_{n}\right\rangle \prec \stackrel{\text { lex }}{\equiv}\left\langle t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right\rangle$, iff there is an $i$ such that $s_{i} \prec t_{i}$ and $s_{1} \equiv t_{1} \ldots s_{i-1} \equiv t_{i-1}$.

Let $s, t, t_{i}$ be terms, $\theta, \theta^{\prime}$ be ground substitutions and $\mathcal{E}$ be a set of axioms. We write $s \equiv_{\mathcal{E}} t$ for $\mathcal{E} \models s \approx t$ and $\theta \equiv_{\mathcal{E}} \theta^{\prime}$ iff for all variables $x$ we have $x \theta \equiv_{\mathcal{E}} x \theta^{\prime}$. We say that $s$ is a $\mathcal{E}$-subterm of $t\left(s \unlhd_{\mathcal{E}} t\right)$ if $s \unlhd_{\equiv_{\mathcal{E}}} t$, and $s$ is a strict $\mathcal{E}$-subterm of $t\left(s \triangleleft_{\mathcal{E}} t\right)$ if $s \triangleleft_{\equiv_{\mathcal{E}}} t$.

## 4 Theoretical Foundation for Unification with Abstraction

Our motivating example from Sect. 2 showcases that first-order arithmetic reasoning requires (i) establishing syntactic difference among terms (e.g. $2 x$ and $x+1$ ), while (ii) deriving they have instances that are semantically equal in models of a background theory $\mathcal{E}$ (e.g. the theory $\mathbb{Q}$ ).

A naive approach addressing (i)-(ii) would be to use an axiomatisation of the background theory $\mathcal{E}$, and use this axiomatisation for proof search in uninterpreted first-order logic. Such an approach can however be very costly. For example, even a relatively simple background theory $\mathbf{A C}$ axiomatizing commutativity and associativity of $\approx$, that is $\mathbf{A C}=\{x+y \approx y+x, x+(y+z) \approx(x+y)+z\}$, would make a superposition-based theorem prover derive a vast amount of useless/redundant formulas as equational tautologies. An approach to circumvent such inefficient handling of equality reasoning is to use unification modulo AC, or in general unification modulo $\mathcal{E}$, as already advocated in [22, 33, 39]. In this section we describe the adjustments we made towards unification modulo $\mathcal{E}$, allowing us to introduce unification with abstraction (Sect. 4.1). We also show under which condition our method can be used to turn a complete superposition calculus using unification modulo $\mathcal{E}$ into a complete superposition calculus using unification with abstraction. Concretely, we show how this can be used for the specific theory of arithmetic $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$ in the calculus Alasca (Sect. 4.2).

### 4.1 Unification with Abstraction - UWA

In a nutshell, unification modulo $\mathcal{E}$ finds substitiutions $\sigma$ that make two terms $s, t$ equal in the background theory, i.e. $\mathcal{E} \models s \sigma \approx t \sigma$. While unification modulo $\mathcal{E}$ removes the need for axiomatisation of $\mathcal{E}$ during superposition reasoning, it comes with some inefficiencies. Most importantly, in contrast to syntactic unification, there is no unique most general unifier $\operatorname{mgu}(s, t)$ when unifying modulo $\mathcal{E}$ but only minimal complete sets of unifiers $\mathrm{mcu}_{\mathcal{E}}(s, t)$, which can be very large; for example, unification modulo $\mathbf{A C}$ is doubly exponential in general [22].

Bypassing the need for unification modulo $\mathcal{E}$, fully abstracted clauses are used in [39], without the need for axiomatisation of the theory $\mathcal{E}$ and without compromising completeness of the underlining superposition-based calculus. Our work extends ideas from [39] and adjusts unification with abstraction (uwa) from [33], allowing us to prove completeness of a calculus using uwa (Theorem 3).

Example 1. Let us first consider the example of factoring the clause $p(2 x) \vee p(x+1)$, a simplified version of the unification step performed in line 5 in Fig. 1. That is, unifying the literals $p(2 x)$ and $p(x+1)$, in order to remove duplicate literals. Within the setting of [39], these literals would only exist in their fully abstracted form, which can be obtained by replacing every subterm $t: \tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$ that is not a variable by a fresh variable $x$, and adding the constraint $x \not \approx t$ to the corresponding clause. Hence, the clause $p(2 x) \vee p(x+1)$ is transformed to $p(y) \vee p(z) \vee y \not \approx$ $2 x \vee z \not \approx x+1$ in [39]. Unification then becomes trivial: we would derive the

```
fn uwa \((s, t)\)
    eqs \(\leftarrow\{s \approx t\} ; \sigma \leftarrow \emptyset ; \mathcal{C} \leftarrow \emptyset ;\)
    while eqs \(\neq \emptyset\)
            ; // (I1) \(\mathcal{E} \models \bigwedge e q s \rightarrow(s \approx t) \sigma \vee \bigvee \mathcal{C}\)
            ; // (I2) \(\quad\left(s^{\prime} \approx t^{\prime} \in e q s \| s^{\prime} \not \approx t^{\prime} \in \mathcal{C}\right) \Longrightarrow s^{\prime} \unlhd s \sigma \& t^{\prime} \unlhd t \sigma\)
            ; // (I3) \(\quad\left(s^{\prime} \approx t^{\prime} \in e q s \| s^{\prime} \not \approx t^{\prime} \in \mathcal{C}\right) \Longrightarrow \mathcal{E} \models s^{\prime} \not \approx t^{\prime} \rightarrow s \sigma \not \approx t \sigma\)
            ; // (I4) \(\quad \forall \theta \cdot(\mathcal{E} \models s \theta \approx t \theta \Longrightarrow \exists \rho . \theta \equiv \mathcal{E} \sigma \rho)\)
            ; // (I5) \(\quad x \sigma \neq x \Longrightarrow x \nless\) eqs
            \(\dot{s} \approx \dot{t} \leftarrow e q s . p o p() ;\)
            if \(\dot{s} \approx \dot{t} \in\{x \approx u, u \approx x\}\) for some \(x \in \mathbf{V}, x \nexists u\)
                \(\sigma \leftarrow \sigma\{x \mapsto u\} ;\)
                eqs \(\leftarrow e q s\{x \mapsto u\} ;\)
                \(\mathcal{C} \leftarrow \mathcal{C}\{x \mapsto u\} ;\)
            else if canAbstract \((\dot{s}, \dot{t})\)
                \(\mathcal{C} . \operatorname{push}(\dot{s} \not \approx \dot{t})\);
            else if \(\dot{s}=f\left(s_{1} \ldots s_{n}\right), \dot{t}=f\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)\)
                \(\operatorname{eqs.push}\left(\left\{s_{1} \approx t_{1} \ldots s_{n} \approx t_{n}\right\}\right)\)
            else
                return \(\perp\);
    return \(\langle\sigma, \mathcal{C}\rangle\);
```

Algorithm 1: Computing an abstracting unifier uwa.
clause $p(y) \vee y \not \approx 2 x \vee y \not \approx x+1$ by factoring, from which $p(2 x) \vee 2 x \not \approx x+1$ is inferred using equality factoring and resolution.

Within unification with abstraction, we aim at cutting out intermediate steps of applying abstractions, equality resolution and factoring. As a result, we skip unnecessary consequences of intermediate clauses, and derive the conclusion of Fig. 2 directly from its first, top-most premise. To this end, we introduce constraints only for those $s, t: \tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$ on which unification fails. We thus gain the advantage that clauses are not present in the search space in their abstracted forms, increasing efficiency in proof search. This is so because abstracted forms of clauses come with a vast number of fresh variables, which makes literals incomparable wrt to simplification orderings within superposition. Further, our unification with abstraction approach is parametrized by a predicate canAbstract to control the application of abstraction, as listed in Algorithm 1. This is yet another significant difference compared to fully abstracted clauses, as in the latter, abstraction is performed for every subterm $t: \tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$ without considering the terms with which $t$ might be unified later.

Full Abstraction. As a first step we will have a look at how completeness using full abstraction instead of unification modulo $\mathcal{E}$ is achieved in [39].

Definition 1 (Full Abstraction). We say a clause $C$ is fully abstracted iff for every term $f\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right) \triangleleft_{\mathcal{E}} C$, then either $f$ is interpreted, or every $t_{i}$ of sort $\tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$ is a variable.

$$
\frac{p(2 x) \vee p(x+1)}{\frac{p(y) \vee p(z) \vee y \not \approx 2 x \vee z \not \approx x+1}{p(y) \vee y \not \approx 2 x \vee y \not \approx x+1}} \frac{p(2 x) \vee 2 x \not \approx x+1}{}
$$

Fig. 2. Example of using unification with full abstraction. Unification with abstraction skips the intermediate steps and derives the last clause directly from the first one.

Note that every clause can be transformed into an equivalent fully abstracted clause by successively rewriting $C[t] \Rightarrow C[x] \vee x \not \approx t$ for every $t$ that violates full abstraction. We call this transformation abstracting a clause.

The calculus presented in [39], has two key properties: Firstly every rule that is applied to fully abstracted clauses, will yield fully abstracted clauses. Secondly every unification preformed in the calculus, does only involve terms without interpreted symbols when if the premises are fully abstracted clauses. Therefore unification modulo $\mathcal{E}$ and syntactic unification are equivalent for these clauses, hence there is no need for a specialized unification algorithm.

Practically speaking this means usual highly efficient term indexing structures can be used, and that there is a single unique most general unifier, instead of a potentially very big set of them. Fully abstracted clauses have a downside too however. That is, they contain a large number of variables, which tends to make literals incomparable, and makes a big number of rule applications possible. Further abstracted clauses tend to have more literals than the non-abstracted ones, which again degrades performance, as more rule applications are possible.

Unification with abstraction. In order to overcome these shortcomings of full abstraction in [33] Unification with Abstraction was introduced. The idea of unification with abstraction is to perform abstraction only on demand.

We illustrate this with Fig. 2. The example shows how the initial clause is first being fully abstracted (1), and then processed using the equality factoring rule (2), and afterwards the two literals introduced by abstraction being factored into one (3). Unification with abstraction compresses this sort of derivation introducing the constraint $a+b \not \approx b+a$, during unification of $f(a+b)$, and $f(b+a)$, when applying equality factoring to the corresponding literal.

In order to do this, in contrast usual unification modulo $\mathcal{E}$, unification with abstraction, does not compute complete sets of unifiers, but a so-called abstracting unifier; a pair $\langle\sigma, \mathcal{C}\rangle$ of a substitution $\sigma$, and a set of constraint literals $\mathcal{C}$. In contrast to the work [33], our definition of an abstracting unifier will independent of the algorithm that computes it, which makes it possible to formalize properties of abstracting unifiers and allow for other, more general versions of unification with abstraction in the future. Nevertheless we provide an algorithm (Algorithm 1) that is a slight modification of the one in [33], which we use for our experiments (Sect. 6). This concrete implementation of an abstracting unifier will help us to illustrate properties we want from abstracting unifiers. The algorithm
performs usual syntactic unification on two terms $s, t$, but whenever the predicate canAbstract holds for two subterms $s^{\prime}, t^{\prime}$, a constraint $s^{\prime} \not \approx t^{\prime}$ is introduced instead of continuing unification on these terms. The intuition behind the canAbstract predicate is that it returns true whenever there is a substitution that can make the two terms equal in the background theory.

Definition 2 (Abstracting Unifier). Let $\sigma$ be a substitution and $\mathcal{C}$ a set of literals. A partial function uwa that maps two terms $s$, $t$ either to $\perp$ or to a pair $\langle\sigma, \mathcal{C}\rangle=\operatorname{uwa}(s, t)$ is called an abstracting unifier.

To ensure that unification with abstraction can replace unification modulo $\mathcal{E}$, we impose the following additional properties over the abstract unifier uwa $(s, t)$.

Definition 3 (uwa Properties). Let $\sigma$ be a substitution and $\mathcal{C}$ a set of literals. Consider $s, t \in \mathbf{T}$ be such that uwa $(s, t)=\langle\sigma, \mathcal{C}\rangle$ and let $\theta$ be an arbitrary ground substituion. We say uwa is

- $\mathcal{E}$-sound iff $\mathcal{E} \models(s \approx t) \sigma \vee \mathcal{C}$;
$-\mathcal{E}$-general iff $\forall \mu \in \operatorname{mcu}_{\mathcal{E}}(s, t) . \exists \rho \cdot \sigma \rho \equiv \mathcal{E} \mu$;
$-\mathcal{E}$-minimal iff $\mathcal{E} \models(s \approx t) \sigma \theta \Longrightarrow \mathcal{E} \vDash(\neg \mathcal{C}) \theta$;
- subterm-founded with respect to the clause ordering $\prec$, iff for every uninterpreted function or predicate $f$, every literal $L[\circ]$, it holds that $\mathcal{E} \models(s \approx$ $t) \theta \Longrightarrow \mathcal{C} \theta \prec L[f(s)] \theta$ or $\mathcal{C} \theta \prec L[f(t)] \theta$.

Further, uwa is $\mathcal{E}$-complete if, for all $s, t \in \mathbf{T}$ with $\operatorname{uwa}(s, t)=\perp$, we have $\operatorname{mcu}_{\mathcal{E}}(s, t)=\emptyset$.

Definition 3 is necessary to lift inferences using unification with abstraction. We thereby want to assure that, whenever $C$ does not hold, then $s$ and $t$ are equal; hence abstracting unifiers uwa $(x, y)=\langle\emptyset, x+y \not \approx y+x\rangle$ would be unsound. The $\mathcal{E}$-generality property enforces that substitutions introduced by uwa are general enough in order to still be turned into a complete set of unifiers. As such, $\mathcal{E}$-generality is needed to rule out cases like uwa $(x+y, 2)=\langle\{x \mapsto 0, y \mapsto 2\}, \emptyset\rangle$, which would not be able to capture, for example, the substitution $\{x \mapsto 1, y \mapsto 1\}$. We note that we use uwa to extend counterexample-reducing inference systems (see Definition 5), allowing inductive completeness proofs. As these inference systems need to derive conclusions that are smaller than the premises, we need the subterm-foundedness property to make sure to only introduce constraints that are smaller than the premises as well. If we have a look at the previous properties, we see that all of them are fulfilled if uwa $(s, t)=\perp$. Therefore we need to make sure that uwa only returns $\perp$ when $s$ and $t$ are not unifiable modulo $\mathcal{E}$; this is captured by $\mathcal{E}$-completeness.

In addition to properties of abstract unifiers uwa $(s, t)$, we also impose conditions over the canAbstract relation that parametrizes uwa $(s, t)$. As Algorithm 1 only introduces equality constraints for subterm pairs that should be unified, a resulting abstracting unifier uwa $(s, t)$ is sound. Further, under the assumption that the clause ordering is defined as in standard superposition (e.g. using multiset extensions of a simplification ordering that fulfills the subterm property), the
abstracting unifier uwa $(s, t)$ is also subterm-founded. However, to ensure that uwa $(s, t)$ is also minimal, interpreted functions should not be treated as uninterpreted ones; hence the canAbstract relation needs to always trigger abstraction on interpreted functions. Finally, we require that canAbstract does not skip terms which are potentially equal modulo $\mathcal{E}$, in order to guarantee completeness. Hence, we define the following properties for canAbstract.

Definition 4 (canAbstract Properties). Let $s, t \in \mathbf{T}$. The canAbstract relation

- captures $\mathcal{E}$, iff for all $s, t$, where $\operatorname{sym}(s)$, or $\operatorname{sym}(t)$ is an interpreted function, it holds that $\exists \rho \cdot \mathcal{E} \vDash(s \approx t) \rho \Longrightarrow$ canAbstract $(s, t)$;
- guards interpreted functions, iff for all $s$, $t$, where $\operatorname{sym}(s)=\operatorname{sym}(t)$ is an interpreted function, canAbstract $(s, t)$ holds.

We will now show that the abstracting unifier computed by Algorithm 1 fulfils all the desired properties, if the canAbstract captures $\mathcal{E}$, and guards uninterpreted functions. In order to show this we will need some invariants of the loop in the algorithm. The structure of the full proof is visualized in Fig. 3.


Fig. 3. Implication structure between properties of canAbstract, and the abstracting unifier computed by Algorithm 1.

Lemma 1. Consider the following invariants.
(I1) $\mathcal{E} \models \bigwedge$ eqs $\rightarrow(s \approx t) \sigma \vee \bigvee \mathcal{C}$
(I2) $\left(s^{\prime} \approx t^{\prime} \in e q s \| s^{\prime} \not \approx t^{\prime} \in \mathcal{C}\right) \Longrightarrow s^{\prime} \unlhd s \sigma \& t^{\prime} \unlhd t \sigma$
(I3) $\left(s^{\prime} \approx t^{\prime} \in e q s \| s^{\prime} \not \approx t^{\prime} \in \mathcal{C}\right) \Longrightarrow \mathcal{E} \models s^{\prime} \not \approx t^{\prime} \rightarrow s \sigma \not \approx t \sigma$
(I4) $\forall \theta \cdot\left(\mathcal{E} \models s \theta \approx t \theta \Longrightarrow \exists \rho \cdot \theta \equiv{ }_{\mathcal{E}} \sigma \rho\right)$
(I5) $x \sigma \neq x \Longrightarrow x \ngtr e q s$

The loop in Algorithm 1 fulfils the invariants (I5)-(I2), and if canAbstract guards interpreted functions it also fulfils (I3), (I4).

Proof. First of all, obviously all of the invariants hold when we enter the loop. We'll show that they hold after each loop iteration considering invariant by invariant.
(I1) Does not hold anymore after line 4. After the first branch, it holds again, since

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{E} & \models \bigwedge e q s \wedge x \approx u \rightarrow(s \approx t) \sigma \vee \bigvee \mathcal{C} \\
\Longrightarrow \mathcal{E} & \models(\bigwedge e q s \wedge x \approx u \rightarrow(s \approx t) \sigma \vee \bigvee \mathcal{C})\{x \mapsto u\} \\
\Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{E} & \models \bigwedge e q s \rightarrow(s \approx t) \sigma\{x \mapsto u\} \vee \bigvee \mathcal{C}\{x \mapsto u\}
\end{aligned}
$$

which is exactly (I1) after that branch. After the second branch (I1) obviously holds again since obviously

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{E} & \models \bigwedge e q s \wedge \dot{s} \approx \dot{t} \rightarrow(s \approx t) \sigma \vee \bigvee \mathcal{C} \\
\Longrightarrow & \mathcal{E} \models \bigwedge e q s \rightarrow(s \approx t) \sigma \vee \bigvee \mathcal{C} \vee \dot{s} \not \approx \dot{t}
\end{aligned}
$$

After the third branch it holds as $\models s_{1} \approx t_{1} \ldots s_{n} \approx t_{n} \rightarrow f\left(s_{1} \ldots s_{n}\right) \approx$ $f\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)$.
(I2) Still holds after line 4. In the first branch it is broken by the modification of $\sigma$, but fixed again by modifying eqs, and $\mathcal{C}$. After the second branch it holds because $\dot{s} \approx \dot{t}$, was in eqs before. After the third branch it holds because $s_{i} \triangleleft \dot{s} \unlhd s \sigma$, and $t_{i} \triangleleft \dot{t} \unlhd t \sigma$.
(I3) Holds after line 4. Again it is broken by modifying $\sigma$, but fixed by modifying eqs, and $\mathcal{C}$ in the first branch. After the second branch it holds because $\dot{s} \approx \dot{t}$, was in eqs before. For third branch, if we assume that canAbstract guards interpreted functions, then we know that $f$ must be uninterpreted, hence for every $i$ we have that $\mathcal{E} \models s_{i} \not \approx t_{i} \rightarrow \dot{s} \not \approx \dot{t}$, which means that $\mathcal{E} \vDash s_{i} \not \approx t_{i} \rightarrow s \sigma \not \approx t \sigma$.
(I4) Holds after line 4. In the first branch the property still holds after modifying $\sigma$, since we can reason as follows. Let $\theta$ be a substitution.

$$
\begin{array}{rlr}
\mathcal{E} \vDash(s \approx t) \theta & \Longrightarrow \mathcal{E} \vDash(s \approx t) \sigma \rho \& \sigma \rho=\theta & \text { due to (I4) } \\
& \Longrightarrow \mathcal{E} \vDash(\dot{s} \approx \dot{t}) \rho & \text { due to (I3) } \\
& \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{E} \vDash(x \approx u) \rho & \text { due to the if condition } \\
\rho^{\prime}:=\{y \mapsto y \rho \mid y \in \mathbf{V}, y \neq x\} & \\
& \Longrightarrow \rho \equiv \mathcal{E}\{x \mapsto u\} \rho^{\prime} & \\
& \Longrightarrow \sigma\{x \mapsto u\} \rho^{\prime} \equiv \mathcal{E} \theta & \text { due to (I5) } \\
\end{array}
$$

In all other branches the property is trivially preserved.
(I5) Still holds after the line 4 . In the branch in line 5 , it is broken by changing $\sigma$, but restored by re-assigning eqs. In all other branches it holds trivially.

Theorem 1. The abstracting unifier uwa computed by Algorithm 1 is subtermfounded and sound. If canAbstract guards interpreted functions, then uwa is $\mathcal{E}$ general and $\mathcal{E}$-minimal. If canAbstract guards interpreted functions and captures $\mathcal{E}$, then uwa is $\mathcal{E}$-complete.

Proof. Note that we only return a value different from $\perp$ when eqs $=\emptyset$. This means soundness follows from invariant (I1), subterm-foundedness from (I2), minimality from (I3), and generality from (I4).

Let's show $\mathcal{E}$-completeness contrapositively. $\perp$ is only returned in line 14 . We know that canAbstract $(\dot{s}, \dot{t})$ does not hold, and as canAbstract captures $\mathcal{E}$. this means

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \nexists \cdot \mathcal{E} \models(\dot{s} \approx \dot{t}) \theta & & \\
\Longrightarrow & \forall \theta \cdot \mathcal{E} \not \models(\dot{s} \approx \dot{t}) \theta & & \\
\Longrightarrow & \forall \theta \cdot \mathcal{E} \not \models(s \approx t) \sigma \theta & & \text { due to (I3) } \\
\Longrightarrow & \forall \theta \cdot \mathcal{E} \not \models(s \approx t) \theta & & \text { due to (I4) } \\
\Longrightarrow & \nexists \cdot \mathcal{E} \models(s \approx t) \theta & &
\end{aligned}
$$

### 4.2 UWA Completeness

We now show how unification with abstraction (uwa) can be used to replace unification modulo $\mathcal{E}$ in saturation-based theorem proving [3]. We recall from [3] that in order to show refutational completeness of an inference-system $\Gamma$, one constructs a model functor $I$ that maps sets of ground clauses $N$ to candidate models $I_{N}$. In order to show that $\Gamma$ is refutationally complete, one needs to show that if $N$ is saturated with respect to $\Gamma$, then $I_{N} \vDash N$. For this, the notion of a counterexample-reducing inference system is introduced.

Definition 5 (Counterexample-Reducing Inference System). We say an inference system $\Gamma$ is counterexample reducing, with respect to a model functor $I$ and a well-founded ordering on ground clauses $\prec$, if for every ground set of clauses $N$ and every minimal $C \in N$ such that $I_{N} \not \forall C$, there is an inference


$$
\text { where } \forall i . I_{N} \vDash C_{i}, \forall i . C_{i} \prec C, D \prec C \text {, and } I_{N} \not \forall D \text {. }
$$

We then have the following key result.

Theorem 2 (Bachmair\&Ganzinger [3]). Let $\prec$ be a well-founded ordering on ground clauses and I be a model functor. Then, every inference system that is counterexample-reducing wrt $\prec$ and $I$ is refutationally complete.

This result also holds for an inference system being refutationally complete wrt $\mathcal{E}$ if for every $N$ it holds that $I_{N} \models \mathcal{E}$.

Proof. Proof by contradiction. We assume that there is a counterexample in $N$. By well-foundedness of $\prec$ on ground clauses, we know that there must be a least counterexample. As the inference system is counterexample-reducing there must be an even smaller counterexample, which contradicts minimality of the former. This means that there cannot be any counterexample in the first place, which means that $I_{N} \models N$, which means the inference system is complete wrt. $\mathcal{E}$ as $I_{N} \models \mathcal{E}$.

When constructing a refutationally complete calculus, one usually first defines a ground counterexample-reducing inference system and then lifts this calculus to a non-ground inference system. Lifting is done such that, if the ground inference system is counterexample reducing, then its lifted non-ground version is also counterexample reducing.

We next show how to transform a lifting of a counterexample-reducing inference system that uses unification modulo $\mathcal{E}$ into a lifting using unification with abstraction. That is, given a counterexample-reducing inference-system using unification modulo $\mathcal{E}$ to define its rules, we construct another counterexamplereducing inference system that uses uwa instead. As we only transform rules that use unification, we introduce the notion of a unifying rule.

Definition 6 (Unifying Rule). An inference rule $\gamma$ is a unifying rule if it is of the form

$$
\frac{C_{1} \quad \ldots \quad C_{n} \quad C}{D \sigma} \text {, where } \sigma \in \operatorname{mcu}_{\mathcal{E}}(s, t) \text {. }
$$

We also define the mapping $\circ_{u w a}$ that maps unifying inferences $\gamma$ to $\gamma_{\mathrm{uwa}}$ as
$\gamma=\left(\begin{array}{lll}C_{1} & \ldots \quad C_{n} \quad C \\ & \left.\text { where } \sigma \in \operatorname{mcu}_{\mathcal{E}}(s, t)\right)\end{array}\right.$
$\Downarrow$
$\gamma_{\text {uwa }}=\left(\begin{array}{ccc}C_{1} & \ldots \quad C_{n} \quad C \\ D \sigma \vee \mathcal{C}\end{array}\right.$, where $\left.\langle\sigma, \mathcal{C}\rangle=\operatorname{uwa}(s, t)\right)$
Soundness of the unifying rule $\gamma$ alone however does not suffice to show soundness of $\gamma_{\mathrm{uwa}}$. Therefore we introduce a stronger notion of soundness that holds for all the rules we will consider to lift.

Definition 7 (Strong soundness). Let $\gamma$ be a unifying rule. We say $\gamma$ is strongly sound iff $\mathcal{E}, C_{1} \ldots C_{n}, C \models s \approx t \rightarrow D$.

Note that strong soundness of $\gamma$ implies soundness, as $\sigma \in \operatorname{mcu}_{\mathcal{E}}(s, t)$ is a unifier of $s$ and $t$.

Lemma 2. Assume that $\gamma$ is strongly sound and uwa is sound. Then, $\gamma_{\mathrm{uwa}}$ is sound.

Proof. Let $M \vDash C_{1} \ldots C_{n}, C$. Let $\langle\sigma, \mathcal{C}\rangle=u w a(s, t)$. Then due to strong soundness of gamma we have $M \models s \approx t \rightarrow D$, hence $M \models(s \approx t) \sigma \rightarrow D \sigma$. Let $\xi$ be some variable interpretation. If $M, \xi \models \mathcal{C}$, then $M, \xi \vDash \mathcal{C} \vee D \sigma$. If $M, \xi \not \vDash \mathcal{C}$, then by soundness of uwa we know that $M, \xi \models(s \approx t) \sigma$, which in turn means that $M, \xi \models D \sigma$, which in turn means that $M, \xi \vDash \mathcal{C} \vee D \sigma$ in this case as well.

Therefore we know that the rule is sound.
We note that not every inference can be transformed using $\circ_{\text {uwa }}$, without compromising completeness. One example of a rule that cannot be lifted using uwa is the equality resolution rule in the classic superposition calculus. Consider for example the clause $D \vee a+b \not \approx b+a$, as well as uwa $(a+b, b+a)=\langle\emptyset, \mathcal{C}\rangle$ and $\mathcal{C}=a+b \not \approx b+a$. Using equality resolution, we would then derive $D \vee \mathcal{C}$ which is the same as the premise. To circumvent this problem, we consider the notion of compatibility with respect to transformations.

Definition 8 (Unifies Strict Subterms). Let $\gamma$ be a unifying inference. Then, $\gamma$ unifies strict subterms iff for every grounding $\theta, u \in\{s, t\}$ there is an uninterpreted function or predicate $f$, a literal $L[f(u)]$, and clause $C^{\prime} \in$ $\left\{C_{1} \ldots C_{n}, C\right\}$, such that $L[f(u)] \theta \preceq C^{\prime} \theta$.

Note that in the above definition we usually have that $L[f(s)]$ or $L[f(t)]$ is some literal of one of the premises.

Definition 9 (uwa-Compatibility). We say an inference $\gamma$ is uwa compatible if it is a unifying inference, strongly sound, and unifies strict subterms.

Theorem 3. Let uwa be a general, compatible, subterm-founded, complete, and minimal abstracting unifier. If $\Gamma$ is the lifting of a counterexample-reducing inference system $\Gamma^{\vartheta}$ with respect to a model functor $I$, and clause ordering $\prec$, then $\Gamma_{\text {uwa }}=\left\{\gamma_{\text {uwa }} \mid \gamma \in \Gamma, \gamma\right.$ is uwa-compatible $\} \cup\{\gamma \in \Gamma \mid \gamma$ is not uwa-compatible $\}$ is the lifting of an inference system $\Gamma_{\mathrm{uwa}}^{\vartheta}$ that is counterexample-reducing with respect to $I$ and $\prec$.

Proof. For the sake of simplicity we assume that all the rules are uwa compatible. The proof can be easily extended to the case where other rules are contained as well, as we do not modify these rules.

Let us define

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Gamma_{\mathrm{uwa}}^{\vartheta}=\left\{\gamma_{\mathrm{uwa}} \theta \mid\right. & \gamma_{\mathrm{uwa}} \in \Gamma_{\mathrm{uwa}}, \\
& \theta \text { is a ground substitution }, \\
& \mathcal{E} \vDash(s \approx t) \theta\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Obviously $\Gamma_{\text {uwa }}^{\vartheta}$ is a lifting of $\Gamma_{\text {uwa }}$, and due to strong soundness of the original inferences the grounded inferences are sound as well. Let's show that $\Gamma_{\text {uwa }}^{\vartheta}$ is counterexample-reducing.

Let $N$ be a set of clauses, and $N^{\vartheta}$ be the grounding of $N$. As $\Gamma^{\vartheta}$ is a counterexample-reducing inference system, we know that for every minimal counterexample $C^{\vartheta} \in N^{\vartheta}$ there is an inference $\gamma^{\vartheta} \in \Gamma^{\vartheta}$ such that $D^{\vartheta} \prec C^{\vartheta}$, and $I^{N^{\vartheta}} \not \forall D^{\vartheta}$.

$$
\gamma^{\vartheta}=\frac{\begin{array}{llrl}
C_{1}^{\vartheta} & \ldots & C_{n}^{\vartheta} & C^{\vartheta} \\
D^{\vartheta}
\end{array}, \frac{1}{4}}{}
$$

As $\Gamma$ is a lifting of $\Gamma^{\vartheta}$, we know that there must be an inference $\gamma \in \Gamma$, and a ground substitution $\theta$, such that $\gamma \theta=\gamma^{\vartheta}$. As $\gamma$ is uwa-compatible, it must be of the following form:

$$
\gamma=\frac{C_{1} \quad \ldots \quad C_{n} \quad C}{D \sigma} \text { where } \sigma \in \operatorname{mcu}_{\mathcal{E}}(s, t)
$$

Which means that we have

$$
\gamma^{\vartheta}=\gamma \theta=\frac{C_{1} \theta \quad \ldots \quad C_{n} \theta}{D \sigma \theta}
$$

with $D \sigma \theta \prec C \theta, C_{i} \theta \prec C \theta$, and $I^{N^{\vartheta}} \not \forall D \sigma \theta$.
As uwa is general (Definition 3), and complete (Definition 3), and due to the definition of $\Gamma_{\text {uwa }}^{\vartheta}$ we know that there is an inference $\gamma_{\text {uwa }}^{\vartheta} \in \Gamma_{\text {uwa }}^{\vartheta}$ with $\sigma^{\prime} \rho \equiv \mathcal{E} \sigma$.

$$
\gamma_{\text {uwa }}^{\vartheta}=\begin{array}{lll}
C_{1} \theta & \ldots & C_{n} \theta \\
D \sigma \theta \vee \mathcal{C} \theta & C \theta \\
\hline
\end{array}
$$

$$
\begin{array}{rlrl}
\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}} & =\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }} \cup \mathcal{A}_{\text {ineq }} & \mathcal{A}_{\text {ineq }} & =\{x>y \wedge y>z \rightarrow x>z\} \\
\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }} & =\mathbf{A C} & & \cup\{x>y \rightarrow x+z>y+z\} \\
& \cup\{j x+k x \approx(j+k) x \mid j, k \in \mathbb{Q}\} & & \cup\{x>y \vee x \approx y \vee y>x\} \\
& \cup\{j(k(x)) \approx(j k) x \mid j, k \in \mathbb{Q}\} & & \cup\{\neg(x>x)\} \\
& \cup\{1(x) \approx x\} & & \cup\{x \geq y \leftrightarrow(x>y \vee x \approx y)\} \\
\cup\{k(x+y) \approx k x+k y \mid k \in \mathbb{Q}\} & & \cup\{x>y \rightarrow+k x>+k y \mid+k \in \mathbb{Q}\} \\
& \cup\{x+0 \approx x, 0 x \approx 0\} & & \cup\{x>y \rightarrow-k y>-k x \mid-k \in \mathbb{Q}\}
\end{array}
$$

Fig. 4. Axioms handled by the Alasca calculus. All are implicity universally quantified.

As $\sigma \in \operatorname{mcu}_{\mathcal{E}}(s, t)$, we know that $s \sigma \equiv_{\mathcal{E}} t \sigma$, which means because $\sigma^{\prime} \rho_{\equiv_{\mathcal{E}}} \sigma$ that $s \sigma^{\prime} \rho \equiv \mathcal{E} s \sigma^{\prime} \rho$. This means since uwa is minimal (Definition 3), that $\mathcal{E} \vDash$ $(\neg \mathcal{C}) \rho \theta$, hence $I^{N^{\vartheta}} \not \nexists \mathcal{C} \rho \theta$, which means that the conclusion of the rule is a counterexample as well.

What is left to show is that the conclusion is smaller than the main premise. As $\gamma$ unifies strict subterm (Definition 8), and uwa is subterm-founded (Definition 3), and $C \theta \succ C_{i} \theta$ we know that $C \theta \succeq L[f(s)] \theta \succ \mathcal{C} \theta$, or $C \theta \succeq L[f(t)] \theta \succ \mathcal{C} \theta$. As $C \theta \succ D \sigma \theta$, this means that $C \theta \succ D \sigma \theta \vee \mathcal{C} \theta$.

Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 together imply that, given a compatible inference system, we need to only specify the right canAbstract predicate in order to perform a lifting using uwa. In Sect. 5 we introduce the calculus Alasca, a concrete inference system with the desired properties, for which a suitable predicate canAbstract can easily be found.

## 5 ALASCA Reasoning

We use the lifting results of Sect. 4 to introduce our Alasca calculus for reasoning in quantified linear arithmetic, by combining superposition reasoning with FourierMotzkin type inference rules. While an instance of such a combination has been studied in the Lasca calculus of [25], LaSCA is restricted to ground, i.e. quantifier-free, clauses. Our Alasca extends Lasca with uwa and provides an altered ground version Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ (Sect. 5.1) which efficiently can be lifted to the quantified domain (Sect. 5.2). As quantified reasoning with linear real arithmetic and uninterpreted functions is inherently incomplete, we provide formal guarantess about what Alasca can prove. Instead of focusing on completeness with respect to $\mathbb{Q}$-models as in [25], we show that Alasca is complete with respect to a partial axiomatisation $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$ of $\mathbb{Q}$-models (Sect. 5.2).

### 5.1 The ALASCA Calculus - Ground Version

The Alasca calculus uses a partial axiomatisation $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$ of $\mathbb{Q}$-models, and handles some $\mathbb{Q}$-axioms via inferences and some via uwa. We therefore split the axiom set
$\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$ into $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$ and $\mathcal{A}_{\text {ineq }}$, as listed in Fig. 4. In order to show our completeness result we will therefore introduce an alternative model functor $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}$, that maps to $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}^{-}}$ models. We will then show that the ground calculus AlascA ${ }^{\theta}$, is counterexamplereducing, hence complete for this class of models, and then show how Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ can be lifted to a non-ground clauses, while still staying complete for this class of models.

Our Alasca calculus modifies the Lasca framework [25] to enable an efficient lifting for quantified reasoning. For simplicity, we first present the ground version of Alasca, which we refer to Alasca $^{\theta}$, whose one key benefit is illustrated next.

Example 2. One central rule of Alasca is the Fourier-Motzkin variable elimination rule (FM). We use (FM) in line 7 of Fig. 1, when proving the motivating example of Sect. 2, given in formula (1). Namely, using (FM), we derive $-2 x-y+s k>0$ from $f(2 x, y)-2 x-y>0$ and $-f(2, y)+s k \geq 0$, under the assumption that $2 x \approx 2$. The (FM) rule can be seen as a version of the inequality chaining rules of [3] for normalized arithmetic terms, chaining the inequalities $s k \geq f(2, y)$ and $f(2 x, y)>2 x+y$. Morover, the (FM) rule can also be considered a version of binary resolution, as it resolves the positive summand $f(2 x, y)$ with the negative summand $-f(2, y)$, mimicing thus resolution over subterms, instead of literals. The main benefit of (FM) comes with its restricted application to maximal atomic terms in a sum (instead of its naive application whenever possible).

ALASCA ${ }^{\theta}$ Normalization and Orderings. Compared to LaSCA [25], the major difference of Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ comes with focusing on which terms are being considered equal within inferences; this in turn requires careful adjustements in the underlying orderings and normalization steps of Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$, and later also in unification within Alasca. In Lasca terms are rewritten in their so-called $\mathbb{Q}$-normalized form, while equality inference rules exploit equivalence modulo AC. Lifting such inference rules is however tricky. Consider for example the application of the rewrite rule $j(k s) \rightarrow(j k) s$ (triggered by $j(k s) \approx(j k) s)$ over the clause $C[j x, x]$. In order to lift all instances of this rewrite rule, we would need to derive $C[(j k) x, k x]$ for every $k \in \mathbb{Q}$, which would yield an infinite number of conclusions. In order to resolve this matter, Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ takes a different approach to term normalization and handling equivalence. That is, unlike LaSca, we formulate all inference rules using equivalence modulo $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$, and do not consider the normalization of terms as simplification rules.

As Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ rules use equivalence modulo $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$, we also need to impose that the simplification ordering used by AlaScA ${ }^{\theta}$ is $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$-compatible ${ }^{4}$. Intuitively, $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$-compatibility means that terms that are equivalent modulo $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$ are in one equivalence class wrt the ordering. This allows us to replace terms by an arbitrary normal form wrt these equivalence classes before and after applying any inference rules, allowing it to use a normalization similar to $\mathbb{Q}$-normalization that does not need to be lifted. Hence, we introduce $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$-normalized terms as being terms

[^0]whose sort is not $\tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$ or of the form $\frac{1}{k}\left(k_{1} t_{1}+\cdots+k_{n} t_{n}\right)$, such that $\forall i . k_{i} \in \mathbb{Z} \backslash 0$, $\forall i \neq j . t_{i} \not \equiv t_{j}, \forall i . t_{i}$ is atomic, $k$ is positive, and $\operatorname{gcd}\left(\left\{k, k_{1} \ldots k_{n}\right\}\right)=1$. Obviously every term can be turned into a $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$-normalized term. For the rest of this section we assume terms are $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$-normalized, and write $\equiv$ for $\equiv \mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$. We also assume that literals with interpreted predicates $\diamond$ are being normalized (during preprocessing) and to be of the form $t \diamond 0$. We write $s \hat{\approx} t$ for equalities, with sorts different from $\tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$, and for equalities of sort $\tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$ that can be rewritten to $s \approx t$ such that $s$ is an atomic term. Finally, Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ also extends Lasca by not only handling the predicates $>$ and $\approx$, but also $\geq$, and $\not \approx$, which has the advantage that inequalities are not being introduced in purely equational problems in Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$.

As discussed in Example 2, the (FM) rule of AlaScA ${ }^{\theta}$ is similar to binary resolution, as it can be seen as "resolving" atomic subterms instead of literals. To formalize such handling of terms in (FM), we distinguish so-called atoms $(t)$, atoms of some term $t$. Doing so, given an $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$-normalized term $t=\frac{1}{k}\left( \pm_{1} k_{1} t_{1}+\right.$ $\ldots \pm_{n} k_{n} t_{n}$ ), we define atoms $^{ \pm}(t)=\left\langle k, k_{1} * \dot{\{ } \pm_{1} t_{1} \dot{\}} \cup \ldots \cup k_{n} * \dot{\{ } \pm_{n} t_{n} \dot{\}}\right\rangle$ and atoms $(t)=\left\langle k, k_{1} *\left\{t_{1} \dot{\}} \cup \ldots \cup k_{n} *\left\{t_{n} \dot{\}}\right\rangle\right.\right.$. We extend both of these functions $f \in\left\{\right.$ atoms, atoms $\left.{ }^{ \pm}\right\}$to literals as follows: $f(t \diamond 0)=f(t)$, assuming that the term $t$ has been normalised to $\frac{1}{k}=1$ before. For (dis) equalities $s \approx t(s \not \approx$ $t)$ of uninterpreted sorts, we define atoms to be $\langle 1, \dot{\{ } s, t \dot{\}}\rangle$. Further we define $\operatorname{maxAtoms}(t)$, to be the set of maximal terms in $\operatorname{atoms}(t)$ with respect $\prec$, and $\operatorname{maxAtom}(t)=t_{0}$ if $\operatorname{maxAtoms}(t)=\left\{t_{0}\right\}$.

In addition, in order to present the calculus more compactly, and to account for our normalization of equalities $(s \approx t \Rightarrow s-t \approx 0)$ we merge the rules Gaussian Elimination, and Ordered Paramodulation, that are present in Lasca, into one rule. In order to do this we introduce the following equivalence relation on equality literals: Let $\equiv \approx$ be the least relation such that $L \equiv L^{\prime} \Longrightarrow L \equiv \approx L^{\prime}$, $s \approx t \equiv \approx t \approx s$, and $k s+t \approx 0 \equiv \approx s \approx-\frac{1}{k} t$. We write $s \hat{\approx} t$ to denote some literal $L$ such that $L \equiv \approx s \approx t$.

Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ Inferences. The inference rules of Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ are summarized in Fig. 5. All rules are parametrized by a $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$-compatible ordering relation $\prec$ on ground terms, literals and clauses. Underlining a literal in a clause or an atomic term in a sum means that the underlined expression is non-strictly maximal wrt to the other literals in the clause, or atomic terms in the sum. We use double-underlining to denote that the expression is strictly maximal.

In the classic superposition calculus rewriting factoring is performed only for positive literals. The reason for this is that only these literals can be productive (a notion we will define later). As we, for example, normalize $\neg s>0$ to $-s \geq 0$ there are no negative inequalities therefore we need to generalize this notion of potentially productive literals. Therefore we define the set $\mathbf{L}_{+}^{\theta}$, called the set of

## Fourier-Motzkin Elimination

$$
\frac{C_{1} \vee+j \underline{\underline{s}}+t_{1} \gtrsim_{1} 0 \quad C_{2} \vee-k \underline{\underline{s^{\prime}}}+t_{2} \gtrsim_{2} 0}{C_{1} \vee C_{2} \vee k t_{1}+j t_{2}>0}(\mathrm{FM})
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text { where } & -j s+t_{1}>0 \succ C_{1} \\
& --k s^{\prime}+t_{0}>0 \succ
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
--k s^{\prime}+t_{2}>0 \succeq C_{2}
$$

$$
-s \equiv s^{\prime}
$$

$$
-\{>\} \subseteq\left\{\gtrsim_{1}, \gtrsim_{2}\right\} \subseteq\{>, \geq\}
$$

## Inequality Factoring

$$
\begin{aligned}
& C \vee+j \underline{\underline{s}}+t_{1} \gtrsim_{1} 0 \vee+k \underline{\underline{s^{\prime}}}+t_{2} \gtrsim_{2} 0 \\
& C \vee k t_{1}-j t_{2} \gtrsim_{3} 0 \vee+k s^{\prime}+t_{2} \gtrsim_{2} 0 \\
\text { where } & -s \equiv s^{\prime} \\
& -\forall L \in\left(C \vee j s+t_{1} \gtrsim_{1} 0\right) \cdot k s^{\prime}+t_{2} \gtrsim_{2} 0 \succeq L \text { or } \\
& \forall L \in\left(C \vee k s^{\prime}+t_{2} \gtrsim_{2} 0\right) \cdot j s+t_{1} \gtrsim_{1} 0 \succeq L \\
- & \gtrsim i \in\{>, \geq\} \\
- & \gtrsim{ }_{3}= \begin{cases}\geq & \text { if } \gtrsim_{1}=\geq, \text { and } \gtrsim_{2}=> \\
> & \text { else }\end{cases}
\end{aligned}
$$

## Contradiction

$$
\frac{C \vee \pm k \diamond 0}{C} \text { (Triv) }
$$

where $-\diamond \in\{>, \geq, \approx \not \approx \not \approx\}$
$-k \in \mathbb{Q}$
$-\mathbb{Q} \not \models \pm k \diamond 0$

## Equality Resolution

$$
\frac{C \vee s \not \approx s^{\prime}}{C}(\mathrm{ER})
$$

where $-s \equiv s^{\prime}$

$$
-s \not \approx s^{\prime} \succeq C
$$

Superposition

$$
\frac{C_{1} \vee \underline{\underline{s}} \hat{\approx} t \quad C_{2} \vee L\left[s^{\prime}\right]}{C_{1} \vee C_{2} \vee L\left[s^{\prime} \rightarrow t\right]}(\mathrm{Sup})
$$

where $-s \equiv s^{\prime}$
$-s \hat{\approx} t \succ C_{1}$
$-L\left[s^{\prime}\right] \in \mathbf{L}_{+}^{\theta} \& L\left[s^{\prime}\right] \succ C_{2}$ or
$L\left[s^{\prime}\right] \notin \mathbf{L}_{+}^{\theta} \& L\left[s^{\prime}\right] \succeq C_{2}$

- $s^{\prime} \unlhd x \in \operatorname{maxAtoms}\left(L\left[s^{\prime}\right]\right)$
$-s \approx t \vee C_{1} \prec C_{2} \vee L\left[s^{\prime}\right]$

Equality Factoring

$$
\begin{gathered}
\frac{C \vee \underline{s}}{\underline{\approx}} \frac{C t_{1} \vee \underline{s}^{\prime}}{\underline{\approx} t_{2}}(\mathrm{EF}) \\
\text { where }-s \equiv t_{2} \vee s \approx t_{1} \\
-s^{\prime} \approx t_{2} \succeq C \vee s \approx t_{1}
\end{gathered}
$$

Binary Resolution

$$
\frac{C \vee j \underline{s}+k \underline{s}^{\prime}+t \diamond 0}{C \vee(j+k) s^{\prime}+t \diamond 0}(\mathrm{TF})
$$

$$
\text { where }-s \equiv s^{\prime}
$$

$$
-\diamond \in\{>, \geq, \hat{\approx}, \not \approx\}
$$

$$
-s, s^{\prime} \in \operatorname{maxAtoms}\left(C \vee j s+k s^{\prime}+t \diamond 0\right)
$$

$$
\text { - there is no uninterperted literal in } C
$$

Factoring

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \frac{C \vee \underline{P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)}}{} \quad D \vee \underline{\neg P\left(t_{1}^{\prime} \ldots t_{n}^{\prime}\right)} \\
& C \vee D\mathrm{BR}) \\
& \text { where }-P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right) \equiv P\left(t_{1}^{\prime} \ldots t_{n}^{\prime}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{gathered}
\left.\frac{C \vee \frac{P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)}{C \vee P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)}\left(\mathrm{P}\left(t_{1}^{\prime} \ldots t_{n}^{\prime}\right)\right.}{C}\right) \\
\text { where }-P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right) \equiv P\left(t_{1}^{\prime} \ldots t_{n}^{\prime}\right)
\end{gathered}
$$

Fig. 5. Rules of the ground calculus $\mathrm{AlaScA}^{\theta}$.

Variable Elimination
where
$-x$ is an unshielded variable
$-K^{-}=K \backslash K^{+}$
$-C$ does not contain $x$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& -\gtrsim_{i}, \gtrsim_{j} \in\{\geq,>\} \\
& -\left(\gtrsim_{i, j}\right)= \begin{cases}(\geq) & \text { if } \geq \in\left\{\gtrsim_{i}, \gtrsim_{j}\right\} \\
(>) & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
\end{aligned}
$$

Fig. 6. Inferene rules used to define the calculus Alasca.
potentially productive literals, as follows.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{L}_{+}^{\theta} & =\left\{P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right) \mid t_{i} \in \mathbf{T}^{\theta}\right\} \\
& \cup\left\{s \approx t \mid s, t \in \mathbf{T}^{\theta}\right\} \\
& \cup\left\{+k \underline{\underline{s}}+t \gtrsim 0 \mid s, t \in \mathbf{T}^{\theta}, \gtrsim \in\{>, \geq\}\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Further, the classic superposition calculus is only performs rewrites within maximal argumens of an equality literal. This is done, as only these literals need to be processed by other rules. In our calculus we can restrict this even further for arithmetic terms, only rewriting with maximal atomic terms in their respective sums. Further, for uninterpreted predicates we need to rewrite all of their arguments. Therefore we introduce the helper function active, returning the set of terms that need to be rewritten in a given literal.

$$
\operatorname{active}(L)=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\left\{t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right\} \quad \text { if } L \in\left\{P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right), \neg P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)\right\} \\
\operatorname{maxAtoms}(L) \text { else }
\end{array}\right.
$$

Finding a right ordering relation is non-trivial, as many different requirements, like compatibility, subterm property, well-foundedness, and stability under substitutions, need to be met [24, 25, 38, 40]. For Alasca, we use a modified version of the Qкво ordering of [25], with the following two modifications.
(i) Firstly, the Alasca ordering is defined for non-ground terms. This means that the abstraction function abs (See in the definition of the ordering below)
might be undefined for terms in cases where there is no maximal element in a sum. An example for this are terms like $x+y$. These terms are incomparable to any other term with respect to our ordering. In addition, our ordering needs to be stable under substitutions in order to work with non-ground terms. Note however that our atom functions atoms and atoms ${ }^{ \pm}$are not stable under substitutions, as the term $f(x)-f(y)$ and the substitution $\{x \mapsto y\}$ demonstrates. Therefore, we parametrize our Alasca ordering by the relation subsSafe. The subsSafe relation fulfils the property that if subsSafe $\left(\frac{1}{k}\left( \pm_{1} k_{1} t_{1}+\cdots \pm_{n} k_{n} t_{n}\right)\right)$, then there is no substitution $\theta$ such that $\pm_{i} k_{i} t_{i} \theta \equiv \mp{ }_{j} k_{j} t_{j} \theta$, for any $i, j$. In general, checking the existence of such a $\theta$ is as hard as unifying modulo $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$. Nevertheless, we can overapproximate the subsSafe relation using the canAbstract predicate. For each of the functions atoms, and atoms ${ }^{ \pm}$we define a respective function atoms safe , and atoms safe that is equal to the respective function on all arguments where subsSafe holds, and undefined otherwise. We only use this guarded version of the functions in the definition of the ordering in order to ensure that it is stable under substitutions.
(ii) Secondly, we adjusted the Alasca ordering to be $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$-compatible, instead of AC-compatible. This is done as follows: The case corresponding to 2 b in the original QKBo makes sure that two terms that are equivalent modulo AC are ordered in the same way, that is they are in one equivalence class wrt to the ordering. As we require $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$-compatibility (See Property 3), we modified this case such that terms that are equivalent modulo $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$ are being ordered in the same way.

For defining orderings we introduce the following additional notation. Consider relations $\prec$ and $\equiv$ are relations on the same set, and relation $\prec^{\prime}$ on a potentially different set. We define $s \prec t \otimes_{\equiv} s^{\prime} \prec^{\prime} t^{\prime}$ iff either $s \prec t$, or $s \equiv t$ and $s^{\prime} \prec^{\prime} t^{\prime}$. We consider $\otimes_{\equiv}$ to be right-associative, and write $\otimes$ for $\otimes_{\equiv_{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{eq}}}}$.

Definition 10 (Qkbo). Let KBo be a Knuth-Bendix Ordering with a weight function $w$ and a precedence relation $\ll$, such that for all terms $t: \tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$ that do not contain a numeral multiplication, or addition, we have $1 \preceq_{\text {Кво }} t$.

We define $s \prec_{\text {Qкво }} t$ iff

1. $\operatorname{abs}(s) \prec_{\text {Кво }} \operatorname{abs}(t)$, or
2. $\operatorname{abs}(s)=\operatorname{abs}(t)$, and either
(a) $s=f\left(s_{1} \ldots s_{n}\right), t=f\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)$, and $\left\langle s_{1} \ldots s_{n}\right\rangle \prec_{Q \text { Кво }}{ }^{\text {lex }}\left\langle t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right\rangle$ for some uninterpreted $f$
(b) atoms $_{\text {safe }}^{ \pm}(s) \dot{\prec}^{\mathrm{wmul}}$ atoms $\mathrm{s}_{\text {safe }}^{ \pm}(t)$
where $-\operatorname{abs}(x)=x$
$-\operatorname{abs}\left(f\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)\right)=f\left(\operatorname{abs}\left(t_{1}\right) \ldots \operatorname{abs}\left(t_{n}\right)\right)$
$-\operatorname{abs}\left(k_{1} t_{1}+\ldots+k_{n} t_{n}\right)=\max _{\prec_{\text {Кво }}}\left\{\operatorname{abs}\left(t_{1}\right) \ldots \operatorname{abs}\left(t_{n}\right)\right\}$
$-k_{1} s \dot{\prec} k_{2} t \Longleftrightarrow s \prec_{Q \text { КВо }} t \otimes k_{1} \not{\prec} k_{2}$
$-+\ddot{\prec}-$

The ordering in defined in such a way that if fulfills the following properties.
In the following lemmas let $a, a_{i}, b$ be arbitrary ground atomic terms, and $s, t, s^{\prime}, t^{\prime}, t_{i}, u$ be arbitrary ground terms.
Property 1 (Atomic Subterm Property). $a \triangleleft_{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{eq}}} t \Longrightarrow a \prec t$
Property 2 (Totality modulo $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$ ). $s \prec t\|s \succ t\| s \equiv t$
Property 3 ( $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$-compaility). $s^{\prime} \equiv s \succ t \equiv t^{\prime} \Longrightarrow s^{\prime} \succ t^{\prime}$
Property 4 (Well-founded). There are no infinite descending chains $t_{1} \succ t_{2} \succ \ldots$.
Property 5 (Context Stability). $a \succ t \Longrightarrow u[a] \succ u[a \mapsto t]$
Property 6 (Product Property). $a \succ b \Longrightarrow j a \succ k b$
Property 7 (Sum Property). $k a \succ k_{i} a_{i} \Longrightarrow k a \succ k_{1} a_{1}+\cdots+k_{n} a_{n}$
Property 8 (One Minimality). If $s \neq 0$ and $s$ is of sort $\tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$, then $s \succeq 1$.
Property 9 (Irreflexivity modulo $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$ ). $s \equiv s^{\prime} \Longrightarrow s \nprec s^{\prime}$
Property 10 (Transitivity). $s \prec t \prec u \Longrightarrow s \prec u$
Property 11 (Antisymmetry). $s \prec t \Longrightarrow t \nprec s$
Property 12 (Negative Maximality). $-j a \succ+k a$
Property 13 (Sub-Sum Property). If there is no $i$ such that $a_{i} \equiv a$, and $\operatorname{sign}\left(k_{i}\right) \neq$ $\boldsymbol{\operatorname { s i g n }}(k)$, then $k a \prec k a+\sum_{i \in I} k_{i} a_{i}$.

Definition 11 (Literal Ordering). We extend the term ordering $\prec$ to literals as follows. $L_{1} \prec L_{2}$ iff

1. $\operatorname{sym}\left(L_{1}\right)$ is interpreted, and $\operatorname{sym}\left(L_{2}\right)$ is uninterpreted
2. $\operatorname{sym}\left(L_{1}\right)$ and $\operatorname{sym}\left(L_{2}\right)$ are uninterpreted, and

$$
\operatorname{sym}\left(L_{1}\right) \ll \operatorname{sym}\left(L_{2}\right) \otimes=\operatorname{args}\left(L_{1}\right) \prec^{\operatorname{lex}} \operatorname{args}\left(L_{2}\right) \otimes \operatorname{pol}\left(L_{1}\right) \prec \operatorname{pol}\left(L_{2}\right)
$$

3. $\operatorname{sym}\left(L_{1}\right)$, and $\operatorname{sym}\left(L_{2}\right)$ are interpreted, and

$$
\operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}^{\mathrm{|v|}}\left(L_{1}\right) \dot{\chi}^{\mathrm{wmul}} \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}^{\mathrm{Iv\mid}}\left(L_{2}\right) \otimes L_{1} \ddot{\prec} L_{2}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { where }-\operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}^{\mid \mathrm{v\mid}}(L)=\langle k, \dot{\{ }\langle t, \mid \operatorname{lv|}(L)\rangle \mid t \in T \dot{\}}\rangle \text { where }\langle k, T\rangle=\operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(L) \\
& -\mid \operatorname{lv}(s \approx t)=0 \\
& -\mid \operatorname{vv}(s \diamond t)=1, \text { for } \diamond \in\{>, \geq, \not \not \approx\} \\
& -\langle s, j\rangle \dot{\prec}\langle t, k\rangle \text { iff } s \prec t \otimes j<k \\
& -s \gtrsim_{1} 0 \breve{\prec} t \gtrsim_{2} 0 \Longleftrightarrow s \prec t \otimes\left(\gtrsim_{1}\right) \ll\left(\gtrsim_{2}\right) \text { for } \gtrsim_{i} \in\{>, \geq\} \\
& -s \approx 0 \ddot{\prec} t \approx 0 \Longleftrightarrow s \not \approx 0 \breve{\imath} t \not \approx 0 \Longleftrightarrow \mathrm{nf}_{\approx}(s) \prec^{\mathrm{mul}} \mathrm{nf}_{\approx}(t) \otimes s \prec t \\
& -\mathrm{nf}_{\tilde{\approx}}(t)=\left\{\sum_{i: k_{i} \geq 0} k_{i} t_{i}, \sum_{i: k_{i} \leq 0} k_{i} t_{i}\right\} \text {, where } \frac{1}{k} \sum k_{i} t_{i}=\mathrm{nf}_{\mathrm{eq}}(t) \\
& -\operatorname{pol}(\neg P(\ldots))=- \text {, } \operatorname{pol}(P(\ldots))=+ \text {, and }+\prec- \\
& -\operatorname{args}(L)=\left\langle t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right\rangle \text {, for } L \in\left\{P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right), \neg P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)\right\} \\
& -\operatorname{sym}(L)=P, \text { for } L \in\left\{P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right), \neg P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Definition 12 (Clause Ordering). We extend the literal ordering $\prec$ to clauses $C, D$ as follows.

$$
C \prec D \text { iff } C \prec^{\text {mul }} D \otimes C \dot{\prec}^{\text {mul }} D
$$

where $s \diamond 0 \dot{\prec} t \diamond 0 \Longleftrightarrow \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(s) \equiv{ }^{\mathrm{wmul}}$ atoms $_{\text {safe }}(t)$ for $\diamond \in\{\approx, \not \approx,>, \geq\}$
In order to establish completeness for our calculus, we will need the following lemmas for our literal ordering. In the following lemmas, we consider $L, L^{\prime}, K, K^{\prime}$, to be ground literals, $a, a^{\prime}, a^{\prime \prime}$ to be a ground atomic term, $s, t, t_{i}, t_{i}^{\prime}, u$ to be a ground term, $C$ to be a ground clause, $\gtrsim_{i} \in\{>, \geq\}$, and $\diamond \in\{>, \geq, \approx \not \approx \neq$.
Lemma 3 (Totality on Ground Literals). $L \prec L^{\prime}\left\|L \succ L^{\prime}\right\| L \equiv L^{\prime}$
Proof. Assume assuming that $L \nsucc L^{\prime}$ and $L^{\prime} \nsucc L$. Then either of the following cases must hold. Both $L$ and $L^{\prime}$ are uninterpreted, and their symbols and polarites are the same, and their arguments are equivalent, or both are positive or negative equalities $s_{1} \diamond s_{2}, t_{1} \diamond t_{2}$, and $\left\{s_{1}, s_{2} \dot{\}} \equiv\left\{t_{1}, t_{2} \dot{\}}\right.\right.$, which obviously means that $L \equiv L^{\prime}$, or both are inequalities $s \gtrsim 0, t \gtrsim 0$, and $s \equiv t$, which again means that $L \equiv L^{\prime}$.
Lemma 4 (Context stability). $a \succ t \Longrightarrow L[a] \succ L[a \mapsto t]$
Proof. If $L[a]=P(\ldots)$, for some uninterpreted predicate $P$ it follows from context stability of terms (Property 5).

Further if $a \succ t$, then obviously atoms $\mathrm{s}_{\text {safe }}^{\mathrm{vv}}(L[a]) \succ^{\mathrm{wmul}}$ atoms $_{\text {safe }}^{\mathrm{Iv\mid}}(L[a \mapsto t])$, which means that the lemma holds for interpreted $L[a]$ as well.
Lemma 5. If $t_{i} \equiv t_{i}^{\prime}$ for all $i$, then $\neg P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right) \succ P\left(t_{1}^{\prime} \ldots t_{n}^{\prime}\right)$
Proof. Follows straight from the definition.
Lemma 6. If $\diamond \in\{>, \geq, \approx, \not \approx\}$, and $a \equiv a^{\prime} \equiv a^{\prime \prime}$, then $C \vee j a^{\prime}+k a^{\prime \prime}+t \diamond 0 \succ$ $C \vee(j+k) a+t \diamond 0$
Proof. This follows straight from the definition of the clause ordering.
Lemma 7. $s \prec t \Longrightarrow s \gtrsim 10 \prec t \gtrsim 20$
Proof. If $s \prec t$ then it obviously must be the case that atoms $\left.{ }_{\text {safe }}^{\operatorname{lv|}(s \gtrsim 1} 0\right)=$ $\operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}^{|v|}(s \gtrsim 20) \preceq \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}^{\text {|v| }}(t \gtrsim 20)$. Therefore it must be the case that $s \gtrsim 1$ $0 \prec t \gtrsim 20$.
Lemma 8. $+k \underline{\underline{a}}+t \gtrsim_{1} 0 \prec-k \underline{\underline{a}}-t \gtrsim_{2} 0$
Proof. Obviously atoms $\mathrm{s}_{\text {safe }}^{\mathrm{v\mid} \mathrm{f}}\left(+k \underline{\underline{a}}+t \gtrsim_{1} 0\right)=\operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}^{\mid \mathrm{v\mid}}\left(-k \underline{\underline{a}}-t \gtrsim_{2} 0\right)$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
+k a & \prec-k a \\
\Longrightarrow+k a-t & \prec-k a \\
\Longrightarrow+k a-t & \prec-k a-t
\end{aligned}
$$

Property 12
sum property Property 7
Property 13

Hence by the definition of the literal ordering this means that the lemma holds.

Lemma 9 (Weak $\equiv \approx$-Compability). $K^{\prime} \equiv \approx K \not \equiv \approx L \equiv \approx L^{\prime} \& K \prec L \Longrightarrow$ $K^{\prime} \prec L^{\prime}$

Proof. For uniterpreted $L, K$ this obviously holds.
We observe that $L \equiv L^{\prime}$ implies that atoms $\mathrm{s}_{\text {safe }}^{|v|}(L) \equiv \operatorname{atoms}_{\mathrm{safe}}^{\mathrm{Iv\mid}}\left(L^{\prime}\right), \mathrm{nf}_{\text {eq }}(L) \equiv$ $\mathrm{nf}_{\text {eq }}\left(L^{\prime}\right)$, and $\operatorname{sym}(L)=\operatorname{sym}\left(L^{\prime}\right)$, and the same for $K, K^{\prime}$ respectively. From these observations the lemma follows straight away.

Lemma 10. Let $a \in$ Atomic $^{\theta}, t_{1}, t_{2} \in \mathbf{T}^{\theta}$.

$$
a \succ t_{1} \& a \succ t_{2} \Longrightarrow a \approx t_{2} \succ t_{1} \not \approx t_{2}
$$

Proof. We observe that due to the subterm property (Property 1), we have $a \succ u \Longrightarrow a \succ u_{i}$ for $u_{i} \in \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(u)$. Further as $\langle a, 0\rangle \in \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}^{\mathrm{VI}}\left(a \approx t_{2}\right)$, and atoms ${ }_{\text {safe }}^{\mathrm{Iv}}\left(t_{1} \not \approx t_{2}\right)=\left\{\langle u, 1\rangle \mid u \in \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}\left(t_{1}-t_{2}\right)\right\}$, this means that $a \approx u \succ t_{1} \not \approx t_{2}$.

Lemma 11. $s \succeq t \Longrightarrow \exists s^{\prime} \in \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(s) \forall t^{\prime} \in \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(t) . s^{\prime} \succeq t$
Proof. Proof by contraposition. Assume $\forall s^{\prime} \in \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(s) \exists t^{\prime} \in$ atoms $_{\text {safe }}(t) . s^{\prime} \nsucceq$ $t^{\prime}$. This means by totality (Property 2) that the maximal of all these $t^{\prime}$ is strictly greater than all $s^{\prime}$, which means by the sum and the product property (Property 7 , Property 6), that $t \succ s$.

Lemma 12. If $L[u]$ is not a positive equality, then $u \succeq s \Longrightarrow L[u] \succ s \approx s$
Proof. Suppose $u \succeq s$. If $L[u]$ is uninterpreted the lemma obviously holds. So let's consider the case where $L[u]$ is interpreted.

If $u$ is a subterm of some atomic term $u^{\prime}$ such that $\left\{u^{\prime}, u^{\prime}\right\} \in \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}^{\text {IvI }}(L[u])$, then by the subterm property $u^{\prime} \succeq s$, and furhter $u^{\prime} \succeq s^{\prime}$ for any $s^{\prime} \in \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(s)$.

If $u$ is not the subterm of some atomic term then $u$ must be an interpreted term. This means that $\left\{\left\langle u^{\prime}, 1\right\rangle \mid u^{\prime} \in\right.$ atoms $\left._{\text {safe }}(u)\right\} \subseteq$ atoms safe $_{\text {sı| }}^{\text {s. }}(L[u])$. By Lemma 11, we know that there is some $u^{\prime}$ such that $u^{\prime} \succeq s^{\prime}$ for $s^{\prime} \in \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(s)$.

This means in both cases we have $\left\langle u^{\prime}, 1\right\rangle \in \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}^{\mathrm{Ivl}}(L[u])$, which is obviously bigger than any element of atoms ${ }_{\text {safe }}^{\text {|v| }}(s \approx s)=\left\{\left\langle s^{\prime}, 0\right\rangle \mid s^{\prime} \in \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(s-s) \dot{\}}\right.$.

Hence $L[u] \succ s \approx s$.
Lemma 13. $t \geq 0 \succ t \approx 0$
Proof. Follows straight from the defintion.
Lemma 14. If $L_{1}, L_{2}$ are interpreted, then maxAtom $\left(L_{1}\right) \succ \operatorname{maxAtom}\left(L_{2}\right) \Longrightarrow$ $L_{1} \succ L_{2}$

Proof. Follows straight from the defintion.
Lemma 15. maxAtoms $(L)=\operatorname{maxAtoms}(\neg L)$
Proof. Follows straight from the defintion.

Lemma 16. If $L_{1}, L_{2}$ are interpreted, but not positive equalities, then $\operatorname{maxAtoms}\left(L_{1}\right) \succ \operatorname{maxAtoms}\left(L_{2}\right) \Longrightarrow L_{1} \succ L_{2}$
Proof. Follows straight from the defintion.
Lemma 17. $\underline{\underline{a}} \not \approx t_{1} \succ L \succ \underline{\underline{a}} \approx t_{1} \Longrightarrow \exists t_{2} \in \mathbf{T}^{\theta}\left(L \equiv \approx \underline{\underline{a}} \approx t_{2}\right)$
Proof. Obviously $L$ cannot be uninterpreted.
Due to Lemma 14, Lemma 15, and totality on ground terms (Property 2) we know that $\operatorname{maxAtom}(L)=\operatorname{maxAtom}\left(L^{\prime}\right)=a^{\prime} \equiv a$.

If $L$ would be an inequality, then from $L \prec a \approx t_{1} \prec \neg L$ it follows that $\operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(L) \prec \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}\left(a \approx t_{1}\right) \prec \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(\neg L)$. But this is not possible as $\operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(L)=$ atoms $_{\text {safe }}(\neg L)$ for inequalities.

If $L$ would be a negative equality then $\neg L \prec L$, which is also not possible.
Therefore we know that $L$ must be a positive equality with maxAtom $(L)=a^{\prime}$, hence $L \equiv \approx a \approx t_{2}$ with $a \succ t_{2}$.

Lemma 18. $-k \underline{\underline{a}}-t_{1} \gtrsim 10 \succ L \succ+k \underline{\underline{a}}+t_{1} \gtrsim 20 \Longrightarrow \exists t_{2} \in \mathbf{T}^{\theta}\left(L \equiv j \underline{\underline{a}}+t_{2} \gtrsim 3\right.$ 0)

Proof. Obviously $L$ cannot be uninterpreted. Further atoms safe $\left(-k a-t_{1} \gtrsim{ }_{1} 0\right)=$ atoms $_{\text {safe }}\left(+k a+t_{1} \gtrsim_{2} 0\right)$, hence it must be the case atoms safe $\left(+k a+t_{1} \gtrsim_{2} 0\right) \equiv$ atoms $\mathrm{safe}(L)$.

This further means that $L$ must be an inequality $L=j_{1} a_{1}+\ldots+j_{n} a_{n} \gtrsim_{3} 0$. It cannot be the case that $\forall i . a_{i} \prec a$, because otherwise by the sum property (Property 7), the product property (Property 6), and stability under contexts (Property 5), we would know that $-j_{1} a_{1}-\ldots-j_{n} a_{n} \prec a \prec k a+t_{1}$, which means by Lemma 7 mean that $\neg L \prec+k a+t_{1} \gtrsim_{2} 0$.

Further it cannot be the case that $\exists i . a_{i} \succ a$, as otherwise due to the same assumptions we would have that $j_{1} a_{1}+\ldots+j_{n} a_{n} \succ a_{i} \succ-a-t_{1}$, which would mean that $L \succ-k a-t_{1} \gtrsim 10$.

Let $j=\sum_{i: a_{i} \equiv a} j_{i}$. It's easy to see then that $L \equiv j s+t_{2} \gtrsim_{3} 0$, for some $t_{2} \in \mathbf{T}^{\theta}$.
Lemma 19. If $L[a] \not \equiv \approx a \approx t_{1}$, then $\underline{\underline{a}} \approx t_{1} \succ L[a] \Longrightarrow \exists t_{2} \in \mathbf{T}^{\theta} .(L[a] \equiv \approx \underline{\underline{a}} \approx$ $t_{2}$ )
Proof. Obviously $L[a]$ cannot be interpreted.
Suppose $L[a]$ is not a positive equality. Then $\exists u[a] .\langle u[a], 1\rangle \in \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}^{\mathrm{Lv1}}(L[a])$. This means that atoms safe $\left(a \approx t_{2}\right) \prec{ }^{\text {mul }}$ atoms safe $(L[a])$, since the maximal element in this multiset is $\langle a, 0\rangle \prec\langle u[a], 1\rangle$ due to the subterm property (Property 1 ), which cannot be the case.

Therefore we know that $L[a]$ is a positive equality. Suppose $a$ occurs as a strict subterm of some uninterpreted term. That would mean that $\exists u[a] \cdot\langle u[a], 0\rangle \in$ $\operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(L[a]) \& a \triangleleft_{\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}} u[a]$ which would again by the subterm property (Property 1)mean that atoms safe $\left(a \approx t_{2}\right) \prec \operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(L[a])$, which is not possible.

Therefore we know that $L[a] \equiv \approx a \approx t_{2}$ for some $t_{2} \in \mathbf{T}^{\theta}$ with $a \succ t_{2}$.

Model construction. We will now define our model functor $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{\circ}$, mapping sets of clauses to what we call the canonical model of the respective set. In this model, as in the classic Bachmair-Ganzinger model construction for regular superposition, the domain will be equivalence classes over the Herbrand universe of the signature. This means that $\tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$ will not be interpreted as $\mathbb{Q}$. Its domain can be rather thought of as some sort of ordered vector spaces over field of rationals. It is to note that $\mathbb{Q}$ is a vector space of this very kind, hence everything we prove with our calculus does indeed hold for $\mathbb{Q}$.

The idea of the model construction is - as in the model construction a lá Bachmair \& Ganzinger - to first build a rewrite system from a set of ground clauses, and then to build a model, which has the normal forms wrt to this rewrite system as its domain. We will be reasoning modulo an equational background theory $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$, so our rewrite system as well as the domain of our model will use equivalence classes modulo $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$ instead of plain terms $t$. On the semantics side we will just write $t$ for the equivalence class of $t$ modulo $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$ in order to keep our definitions more readable. As we do not only want to interpret equality, but also, inequalities and uninterpreted predicates, we need to collect the data to interpret the other predicates in parallel with the data to interpret equality (i.e. the rewrite system).

The model construction is structured as follows. First we will build a sequence of sets of so-called atomic assertions, based on the clause ordering $\prec$. Then we will define the actual model as the limit of this sequence.

Definition 13. Let $s, t, t_{1}, \ldots t_{n}$ be equivalence classes of ground terms terms modulo $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$, and $P$ be a predicate symbol, and $s$ be atomic, and $s \succ t$. We define an atomic assertion is one of the following:
$-a$ rewrite rule $s \rightarrow t$

- an atom $P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)$
- a lower bound $s>t$

Definition 14. Let $\mathcal{I}$ be a set of atomic assertions. We define

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathcal{I} \approx=\{s \rightarrow t \in \mathcal{I}\} \\
& \mathcal{I}^{P}=\left\{P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right) \in \mathcal{I} \mid P \text { is an uninterpreted predicate symbol. }\right\} \\
& \mathcal{I}^{>}=\{s>t \in \mathcal{I}\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Each set of atomic assertions is meant to represent an $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$-model. Therefore we need to define how to turn a $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$-model into a first-order structure. We will call this first-order structure an $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$-structure. Its domain are equivalence classes of terms; more specifically tall the normal forms of $\mathcal{I} \approx$ modulo $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$. In that way we make sure that our $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$-model actually models $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$. We will denote the normal form of a term $t$ wrt the rewritesystem $R$ by $t \downarrow_{R}$.

Definition 15. Let $\mathcal{I}$ be a set of atomic assertions. We call $\mathcal{I}$ an $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$-structure if for all for all $s \rightarrow t \in \mathcal{I}$ we have that $s$ is irreducible in $\mathcal{I} \approx \backslash\{s \rightarrow t\}$,for all $P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right) \in \mathcal{I}, t_{1} \ldots t_{n}$ are irreducible in $\mathcal{I}^{\approx}$, and for all $s>t \in \mathcal{I}^{\approx}$, $s$ is irreducible in $\mathcal{I} \approx$.

Definition 16. Let $\mathcal{I}$ be an $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$-structure.
Then we identify $\mathcal{I}$ with the first-order structure interpreting symbols as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{I}(\tau) & =\left\{t \downarrow_{\mathcal{I} \approx} \mid t \in \mathbf{T}, t: \tau\right\} \\
\mathcal{I}(t) & =t \downarrow_{\mathcal{I} \approx} \\
\mathcal{I}(P)\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right) & \Longleftrightarrow P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right) \in \mathcal{I}^{P} \\
\mathcal{I}(\geq 0)(t) & \Longleftrightarrow(\mathcal{I}(>0)(t) \| \mathcal{I}(t)=0) \\
\mathcal{I}(>0)(t) & \Longleftrightarrow \begin{cases}\mathbb{Q} \vDash t>0 & \text { if } t \in \mathbb{Q} \\
\exists s>l \in \mathcal{I}^{>} \cdot \mathcal{I} \models k l+t^{\prime} \geq 0 & \text { if } t=+k \underline{\underline{s}}+t^{\prime} \\
\mathcal{I} \not \models+k \underline{\underline{s}}-t^{\prime} \geq 0 & \text { if } t=-k \underline{\underline{s}}+t^{\prime}\end{cases}
\end{aligned}
$$

Lemma 20. If $\mathcal{I}$ is an $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$-structure, then $\mathcal{I} \models \mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$.

Proof. As a first step we need to show that our term-interpretation is well-defined. That is, we need to show that the rewrite system $\mathcal{I} \approx$ is confluent, and terminating. The rewrite system is obviously terminating as for every rewrite rule $s \rightarrow t \in \mathcal{I} \approx$, we have that $s \succ t$, and by Property $4, s$ is well-founded.

Let us now show local confluence.
Let $s_{1} \rightarrow t_{1}, s_{2} \rightarrow t_{2} \in \mathcal{I}$, and $u$ be a term that can be rewritten by both of the rules. By definition of an $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$-structure, we know that it cannot be the case that $s_{1} \unlhd_{\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}} s_{2}$, or $s_{2} \unlhd_{\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}} s_{1}$. From this it is easy to see that $u\left[s_{1} \rightarrow t_{1}\right]\left[s_{2} \rightarrow t_{2}\right] \equiv u\left[s_{2} \rightarrow t_{2}\right]\left[s_{1} \rightarrow t_{1}\right]$.

All axioms in $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$ obviously hold as our domain is terms modulo $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$.
So let us have a look at the other axioms.
We will first show transitivity holds. First we normalize the axiom to the clause $\neg y-x>0 \vee \neg z-y>0 \vee z-x>0$. The clause holds, iff it holds for every $\mathcal{I}(x), \mathcal{I}(y), \mathcal{I}(z)$. We proof transitivity holds by induction on the term ordering $\prec$.

Let $I(x)=j_{x} \underline{\underline{s_{x}}}+\hat{s}_{x}, I(y)=j_{y} \underline{\underline{s_{y}}}+\hat{s}_{y}$, and $I(z)=j_{z} \underline{\underline{s_{z}}}+\hat{s}_{z}$.
Suppose transitivity does not hold for these. That would mean $\mathcal{I} \models I(y)-$ $I(x)>0 \wedge I(z)-I(y)>0 \wedge I(x)-I(z) \geq 0$. If $I(x)-I(z) \approx 0$, then we would have $I(y)-I(x)>0 \wedge I(x)-I(y)>0$, which is a contradiction. This means that we have $\mathcal{I} \models I(y)-I(x)>0 \wedge I(z)-I(y)>0 \wedge I(x)-I(z)>0$.

Let us now show the following lemma.

$$
\begin{align*}
& \mathcal{I} \models\left(j_{1} \underline{\underline{s_{1}}}+\hat{s}_{1}\right)-\left(j_{2} \underline{\underline{s_{2}}}+\hat{s}_{2}\right)>0  \tag{A}\\
& \& \mathcal{I}=\left(j_{2} \underline{\underline{s_{2}}}+\hat{s}_{2}\right)-\left(j_{3} \underline{\underline{s_{3}}}+\hat{s}_{3}\right)>0  \tag{B}\\
& \& \mathcal{I}=\left(j_{3} \underline{\underline{s_{3}}}+\hat{s}_{3}\right)-\left(j_{1} \underline{\underline{s_{1}}}+\hat{s}_{1}\right)>0  \tag{C}\\
& \Longrightarrow\left(s_{3} \succ s_{1} \Longrightarrow s_{2} \succ s_{3}\right)
\end{align*}
$$

This can be shown as follows: Assume $s_{3} \succ s_{1}$, and $s_{3} \succ s_{2}$ case $j_{3}>0$ :

$$
\begin{array}{rlrl}
(C) & \Longleftrightarrow & \exists s_{3}>l \in \mathcal{I} \cdot \mathcal{I} & =j_{3} l+\hat{s}_{3}-\left(j_{1} s_{1}+\hat{s}_{1}\right) \geq 0 \\
& \Longleftrightarrow & \exists s_{3}>l \in \mathcal{I} \cdot \mathcal{I} & =j_{3} l+\hat{s}_{3}-\left(j_{2} s_{2}+\hat{s}_{2}\right) \geq 0 \quad \text { by I.H. and (A) } \\
& \Longleftrightarrow & \mathcal{I} \vDash j_{3} s_{3}+\hat{s}_{3}-\left(j_{2} s_{2}+\hat{s}_{2}\right)>0
\end{array}
$$

Which contradicts $(B)$.
case $j_{3}<0$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
(C) & \Longleftrightarrow & \mathcal{I} \not \models-j_{3} \underline{\underline{s_{3}}}-\hat{s}_{3}+j_{1} s_{1}+\hat{s}_{1} \geq 0 \\
& & \mathcal{I} \not \models-j_{3} \underline{\underline{s_{3}}}-\hat{s}_{3}+j_{1} s_{1}+\hat{s}_{1}>0 \\
& \Longleftrightarrow & \nexists s_{3}>l \in \mathcal{I} . \mathcal{I} \models-j_{3} l-\hat{s}_{3}+j_{1} s_{1}+\hat{s}_{1}>0 \\
& \Longleftrightarrow & \forall s_{3}>l \in \mathcal{I} \cdot \mathcal{I} \models j_{3} l+\hat{s}_{3}-j_{1} s_{1}-\hat{s}_{1} \geq 0 \\
& \Longleftrightarrow & \forall s_{3}>l \in \mathcal{I} \cdot \mathcal{I} \models j_{3} l+\hat{s}_{3}-j_{2} s_{2}-\hat{s}_{2} \geq 0 \quad \text { by I.H. and (A) } \\
& \Longleftrightarrow & \mathcal{I} \not \models-j_{3} s_{3}-\hat{s}_{3}+j_{2} s_{2}+\hat{s}_{2}>0
\end{aligned} \quad \text { (A) }
$$

Which contradicts $(B)$.
As we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathcal{I} \models\left(j_{x} \underline{\underline{s_{x}}}+\hat{s}_{x}\right)-\left(j_{y} \underline{\underline{s_{y}}}+\hat{s}_{y}\right)>0 \\
& \mathcal{I} \models\left(j_{y} \underline{\underline{s_{y}}}+\hat{s}_{y}\right)-\left(j_{z} \underline{\underline{s_{z}}}+\hat{s}_{z}\right)>0 \\
& \mathcal{I} \models\left(j_{z} \underline{\underline{s_{z}}}+\hat{s}_{z}\right)-\left(j_{x} \underline{\underline{s_{x}}}+\hat{s}_{x}\right)>0
\end{aligned}
$$

which means by the lemma, that we get

$$
\begin{aligned}
& s_{x} \succ s_{y} \Longrightarrow s_{z} \succ s_{x} \Longrightarrow s_{y} \succ s_{z} \\
& s_{y} \succ s_{x} \Longrightarrow s_{z} \succ s_{y} \Longrightarrow s_{x} \succ s_{z}
\end{aligned}
$$

Both of these implication chains are contradictory, hence transitivity must hold.
For all other axioms one can easily see that they follow from the definition of a $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$ model by simple definition unfolding.

Definition 17 (Canonical Model). Let $N$ be a ground set of clauses, and $C \in N$, then we call $\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}$ the $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$-model up to $C$ wrt. $N$, $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}$ the $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$-model for $C$ wrt. $N$, and $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$ the canonical model wrt. $N$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}=\bigcup_{C \in N} \mathcal{I}_{C}^{N} \\
& \mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}=\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N} \cup \text { produce }^{N}(C) \\
& \mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}=\bigcup_{D \in N, D \prec C} \mathcal{I}_{D}^{N} \\
& \operatorname{produce}^{N}\left(C^{\prime} \vee \underline{\underline{L}}\right)= \begin{cases}\emptyset & \text { if } \mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N} \models C^{\prime} \vee L \\
\emptyset & \text { else if } t \in \text { active }(L) \text { that is reducible in } \mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N} \\
\left\{s>-\frac{1}{k} t\right\} & \text { else if } L=+k \underline{\underline{s}}+t \gtrsim 0, \text { where } \gtrsim \in\{>, \geq\} \\
\{s \rightarrow t\} & \text { \& } \forall k_{1} t_{1}+\ldots+k_{n} t_{n} \gtrsim^{\prime} 0 \in C^{\prime} . \mathbb{Q} \models \Sigma_{i: t_{i} \equiv s} k_{i} \leq 0 \\
\text { else if } L \equiv \approx \underline{s} \approx t \\
\left\{P\left(t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n}\right)\right\} & \text { else if } L=P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right) \\
\emptyset & \text { else }\end{cases}
\end{aligned}
$$

We say a clause $C=C^{\prime} \vee \underline{\underline{L}}$ is productive for $L$ iff produce $^{N}(C) \neq \emptyset$.

Completeness. In order to show that our Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ is refutationally complete, by using the framework mentioned in Sect. 4, we need to establish that our calculus reduces counterexamples. For that we will need to establish some lemmas first.

First of all we need to make sure that every of our potential models can indeed be used to interpret clauses.

Lemma 21. For every set of clauses $N, \mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}, \mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}$, and $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$ are $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$-structures.
Proof. Follows straight from the definition.
Next we observe that the interpretation of equality of some term stabilizes as soon as a literal greater than the term itself is processed in the model construction. Formally we establish this as the following lemma.

## Lemma 22 (Equality Stabilisation).

$$
C \succeq s \approx s \Longrightarrow \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}(s)=\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}(s)=\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}(s)
$$

Proof. Firstly as $\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N} \subseteq \mathcal{I}_{C}^{N} \subseteq \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$, any rule used to rewrite $s$ in $\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}$ will also be in $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$.

Let $u \rightarrow v \in \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$. If $u \rightarrow v$ is used in a rewriting of $s$, then there must be some atomic subterm $s^{\prime} \unlhd s$, such that $s^{\prime} \succeq u$, which means by the subterm property that $s \succeq u$. Then there is some productive clause $D=D^{\prime} \vee \underline{\underline{u} \hat{\approx} v}$. Since $u \succ v$, we have $u \approx u \succ u \approx v$. Further by $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$-compatibility (Property 3), and wellfoundedness (Property 4) we know that $u \not \equiv_{\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}} v$. Therefore by $\equiv \approx$-compatibility (Lemma 9), this means that $D^{\prime} \prec u \hat{\approx} v \prec u \approx u \preceq s \approx s \preceq C$. Which further means that $D \prec C$, hence that $u \rightarrow v \in \mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}$ as well.

Lemma 23. Let $L[u]$ be a ground literal that is not a positive equality

$$
C \succeq L[u] \& u \succeq s \Longrightarrow \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}(s)=\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}(s)=\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}(s)
$$

Proof. This follows straight from Lemma 22, and Lemma 12.
Lemma 24 (Monotonicity). Let $L \in \mathbf{L}^{\theta}, C \in N$.

$$
\begin{gathered}
L \preceq C \& \mathcal{I}_{C}^{N} \models L \Longrightarrow \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models L \\
L \preceq C \& \mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N} \models L \Longrightarrow \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models L
\end{gathered}
$$

Proof. We proof by induction on $L$, and $C$ along $\prec$.
Let's case split on $L$
case $s \approx t$ : For $\mathcal{I} \in\left\{\mathcal{I}_{\alpha_{C}}^{N}, \mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}\right\}$ we have $\mathcal{I} \subset \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$, which means that if $s$, and $t$ rewrite to the same term in $\mathcal{I}$, then they also do so in $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$.
case $s \not \approx t$ : By Lemma 23 we have that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}(s)=\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}(s)=\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}(s)$, and $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}(t)=$ $\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}(t)=\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}(t)$. This means both $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N} \models s \not \approx t$, and $\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N} \models s \not \approx t$ imply, that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models s \not \approx t$.
case $t>0$ : By Lemma 23 we have that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}(t)=\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}(t)=\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}(t)$. We case split on $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}(t)$.
case $k$ : This means by definition that if $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models t>0 \Longleftrightarrow \mathbb{Q} \models k>0 \Longleftrightarrow$ $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N} \models t>0 \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N} \models t>0$.
case $+k \underline{\underline{s}}+t^{\prime}$ : Note that since $+k s+t^{\prime}=\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}(t)=\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}(t)=\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}(t)$, it must be the case that $s=\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}(s)=\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}(s)=\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}(s)$. Further note that by construction for every $s>l \in \mathcal{I}_{C}^{N} \supseteq \mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}, s \succ l$, and $s \in$ Atomic ${ }^{\theta}$. This means that maxAtom $(s) \succ \operatorname{maxAtom}(l)$, and maxAtom $(s) \succ \operatorname{maxAtom}\left(t^{\prime}\right)$, which means that we have that $+k s+t^{\prime}>0 \succ+k l+t^{\prime} \geq 0$. This means we can reason as follows.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{I} \models t>0 & \Longleftrightarrow \quad \exists s>l \in \mathcal{I} \cdot \mathcal{I} \models k l+t^{\prime} \geq 0 \\
& \Longleftrightarrow \quad \exists s>l \in \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \cdot \mathcal{I} \models k l+t^{\prime} \geq 0 \quad\left(\mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}\right) \\
& \Longleftrightarrow \quad \exists s>l \in \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \cdot \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models k l+t^{\prime} \geq 0 \quad \text { (by induction hypothesis) } \\
& \Longleftrightarrow \quad \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models t>0
\end{aligned}
$$

case $-k s+t^{\prime}$ : Suppose $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models t>0$. This is the cases iff $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models+k s-t^{\prime} \geq 0$. if $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models+k s-t^{\prime}>0$ : That means there is a $s^{\prime}>l \in \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$ such that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models k l-t^{\prime} \geq 0$, and $s \equiv s^{\prime}$. This means that there must be a productive clause $D=D^{\prime} \vee j \underline{\underline{s^{\prime}}}-j l \gtrsim 0$.

$$
\begin{align*}
& j s \prec-k s  \tag{Property12}\\
& \Longrightarrow \quad j s-j l \prec-k s  \tag{Property7}\\
& \Longrightarrow \quad j s-j l \prec-k s+t^{\prime}  \tag{Property13}\\
& \Longrightarrow \quad j s-j l \gtrsim 0 \prec-k s+t^{\prime}>0  \tag{Lemma7}\\
& \Longrightarrow \quad D^{\prime} \vee j s-j l \gtrsim 0 \prec-k s+t^{\prime}>0 \\
& \Longrightarrow \quad D^{\prime} \vee j s-j l \gtrsim 0 \prec t>0  \tag{Lemma7}\\
& \Longrightarrow \quad D^{\prime} \vee j s-j l \gtrsim 0 \prec t>0 \vee C^{\prime}
\end{align*}
$$

Hence by construction it must be the case that $s>l \in \mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N} \subset \mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}$.
We know that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models k l-t^{\prime} \geq 0 \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models-k l+t^{\prime}>0$. As $s \succ l$, and $s \succ-t^{\prime}$, by the sum property (Property 7 ), and Lemma 7 we know that $-k l+t^{\prime}>0 \prec L$, which means that by induction hypothesis for $\mathcal{I} \in\left\{\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}, \mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}\right\}$ we have $\mathcal{I} \not \models-k l+t^{\prime}>0$, hence $\mathcal{I} \models k l-t^{\prime} \geq 0$. Combining that we get that $\mathcal{I} \models-k s+t^{\prime}>0$.
else: That means that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}(t)=0$, which means that $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}(t)=0$ as well. case $t \geq 0$ : For $\mathcal{I} \in\left\{\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}, \mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}\right\}$, we can reason as follows. This is the case iff $\mathcal{I} \models t>0$, or $\mathcal{I} \models t \approx 0$
If $\mathcal{I} \models t>0$, then we can reason as in the case where $L=t>0$ to establish that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models t>0$.
Otherwise if $\mathcal{I} \models t \approx 0$, by Lemma 23, we know that $\mathcal{I}(t)=\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}(t)$, which means that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models t \approx 0$ as well.
case $P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)$ : For both $\mathcal{I} \in\left\{\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}, \mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}\right\}$, we can reason as follows.

$$
\begin{array}{rlrl}
\mathcal{I} \models P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right) & \Longleftrightarrow P\left(\mathcal{I}\left(t_{1}\right) \ldots \mathcal{I}\left(t_{n}\right)\right) \in \mathcal{I} & \\
& \Longleftrightarrow P\left(\mathcal{I}\left(t_{1}\right) \ldots \mathcal{I}\left(t_{n}\right)\right) \in \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} & & \left(\text { as } \mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}\right) \\
& \Longleftrightarrow P\left(\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}\left(t_{1}\right) \ldots \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}\left(t_{n}\right)\right) \in \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} & & (\text { due to Lemma 23) } \\
& \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right) &
\end{array}
$$

case $\neg P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)$ : By Lemma 23 we know that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}\left(t_{i}\right)=\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}\left(t_{i}\right)=\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}\left(t_{i}\right)$. Suppose $P\left(\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}\left(t_{1}\right) \ldots \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}\left(t_{n}\right)\right) \in \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$. Then there is some productive clause $D=D^{\prime} \vee P\left(t_{1}^{\prime} \ldots t_{n}^{\prime}\right)$ with $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}\left(t_{i}^{\prime}\right)=\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}\left(t_{i}\right)$. As $D$ is productive $t_{i}^{\prime}=\mathcal{I}_{D}^{N}\left(t_{i}^{\prime}\right)$, and by Lemma $23 t_{i}^{\prime}=\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}\left(t_{i}^{\prime}\right)=\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}\left(t_{i}\right)$. This means as we only rewrite to smaller things that $P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right) \succeq P\left(t_{1}^{\prime} \ldots t_{n}\right)$. Together with Lemma 5 this means that $D \prec C$, hence $P\left(t_{1}^{\prime} \ldots t_{n}^{\prime}\right) \in \mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N} \subseteq \mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}$ as well.

Lemma 25. If $C=C^{\prime} \vee \underline{\underline{L}}$ is a productive clause, then for $\mathcal{I} \in\left\{\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}, \mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}\right\}$. $\mathcal{I} \models L \& \mathcal{I} \not \vDash C^{\prime}$ 。

Proof. Obviously due to Lemma 24, we know that if the lemma holds for $\mathcal{I}=\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}$, then it will also hold for $\mathcal{I}=\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$. Hence we only need to have a look at the case where $\mathcal{I}=\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}$

We first show that $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N} \models L$ by case splitting on produce ${ }^{N}(L)$
case $s \rightarrow t$ : That means that $L=s \hat{\approx} t$, which obviously holds in $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}$.
case $s>l$ : That means that $L=j s-j l \gtrsim 0$, which obviously holds in $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}$, since $j l-j l \geq 0$ holds in $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}$.
case $P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)$ : That means that $L=P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)$, which obviously holds in $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}$.

Next we show that $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N} \not \vDash C^{\prime}$. Let $L^{\prime}$ be any literal of $C^{\prime}$. As $C$ is productive we know that $L^{\prime} \prec L$, and that $\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N} \not \models L^{\prime}$. If $\neg L^{\prime} \prec L$ then by Lemma 24 we know that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models \neg L^{\prime}$, which means $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models L^{\prime}$, which means by the same lemma that $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N} \notin L^{\prime}$, hence $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N} \models \neg L^{\prime}$.

Hence by Lemma 3 we can assume that $L^{\prime} \prec L \preceq \neg L^{\prime}$.
We case split on $L^{\prime}$.
case $s \neq \not \approx t$, or $\neg P\left(t_{0} \ldots t_{n}\right)$ : Not possible since then it would be the case that $\neg L^{\prime} \prec L^{\prime}$.
case $s \hat{\approx} t_{1}$ : Since $C$ is productive we know that it cannot be the case that $L \equiv \approx s \hat{\approx} t_{1}$, due to the side condition of produce ${ }^{N}(C)$.
As $\neg L^{\prime} \succ L \succ L^{\prime}$, this means by weak compatibility (Lemma 9), that $s \not \approx t_{1} \succ L \succ s \approx t_{1}$, which further means by Lemma 17 that $L \equiv \approx \underline{\underline{s}} \hat{\approx} t_{2}$.
As $C$ is productive this means by definition that $\mathcal{I}_{<C}^{N} \models t_{1} \not \approx t_{2}$, hence by Lemma 23 we know that $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N} \models t_{1} \not \approx t_{2}$. Futher as $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N} \models L \equiv \approx s \approx t_{2}$, this means that $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N} \neq s \approx t_{1}$.
case $t \gtrsim 0$ : Obvisously $t \gtrsim 0 \equiv k \underline{\underline{s}}+t^{\prime} \gtrsim 0$.
if $k<0$ : Then by Lemma 8, and weak compatibility (Lemma 9), it would be the case $\neg L^{\prime} \prec L^{\prime}$, which contradicts $L^{\prime} \prec L \prec \neg L^{\prime}$.
else $k>0$ : It cannot be the case that $L \equiv L^{\prime}$ due to the side condition of produce ${ }^{N} C$.
Hence by $t \gtrsim 0 \prec L \prec \neg(t \gtrsim 0)$, and weak compatibility (Lemma 9), we know that $k s+t^{\prime} \gtrsim 0 \prec L \prec-k s-t^{\prime} \gtrsim^{\prime} 0$. By Lemma 18 we therefore know that $L \equiv j s+t_{2} \gtrsim^{\prime \prime} 0$. As $C$ is productive this means by the same side condition of the definition of produce ${ }^{N}(C)$ that this cannot be the case.
case $P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)$ : We know $\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N} \not \models P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)$. Suppose $\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N} \models P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)$. Then it must be the case that $C$ is productive with $L=P\left(t_{1}^{\prime} \ldots t_{n}^{\prime}\right)$, such that $t_{i}^{\prime} \equiv t_{i}$. This would mean that $L$ is not strictly maximal though, which would mean that $C$ is not productive.

Theorem 4. LlaScA $^{\theta}$ is a counterexample-reducing inference system with respect to $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}$ and $\prec$.

Proof. Let $C=C^{\prime} \vee \underline{L}$ be a minimal counterexample that is not the empty clause.
if $C$ is productive: Then by Lemma 25 , we know that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models C$, hence $C$ cannot be a counterexample.
else if $\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N} \models C^{\prime} \vee L$ : Then by Lemma $24 \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models C^{\prime} \vee L$, which means that $C$ cannot be a counterexample either.
else if $C=C^{\prime \prime} \vee \underline{L}^{\prime} \vee \underline{L}$, and $L \in \mathbf{L}_{+}^{\theta}$ : Then due totality (Lemma 3) we know that $L \equiv L^{\prime}$. We case split on $\left\langle L, L^{\prime}\right\rangle$
case $\left\langle s \approx_{\tau} t, s^{\prime} \approx_{\tau} t^{\prime}\right\rangle$ where $\tau \neq \tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$ : If $s \equiv t$, or $s^{\prime} \equiv t^{\prime}$, then the $C$ would not be a counterexample. So due to totality (Property 2) we can assume without loss of generality that $s \succ t, s^{\prime} \succ t^{\prime}$, which means by irreflexivity compatibility (Property 3 and Irreflexivity (Property 9), that $s \equiv s^{\prime}$, and $t \equiv t^{\prime}$
There is an instance of Rule (EF)

$$
\frac{C^{\prime} \vee s \approx t \vee s^{\prime} \approx t^{\prime}}{C^{\prime} \vee t \not \approx t^{\prime} \vee s^{\prime} \approx t^{\prime}}
$$

Therefore since $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models C$ it must also be the case that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \vDash C^{\prime} \vee t \not \approx$ $t^{\prime} \vee s^{\prime} \approx t^{\prime}$. Further the hypothesis is smaller than the conclusion, as from $s \succ t \equiv t^{\prime}$, Property 3, and Lemma 14 it follows that $s \approx t \succ t \not \approx t^{\prime}$.
case $\left\langle k \diamond 0, L^{\prime}\right\rangle$ or $\langle L, k \diamond 0\rangle$ : Then either $\mathbb{Q} \models k \diamond 0$, hence $C$ cannot be a counterexample, or there is an instance of (Triv) that reduces the counterexample.
case $\left\langle+j \underline{s} \pm k \underline{s}^{\prime}+t \diamond 0, L^{\prime \prime}\right\rangle$, or $\left\langle L^{\prime \prime},+j \underline{s} \pm k \underline{s^{\prime}}+t \diamond 0\right\rangle$ where $s \equiv s^{\prime}$ : Then due to Lemma 6, there is an instance of rule (TF) that reduces the counterexample.
case $\left\langle+j \underline{\underline{s}}+t \diamond 0,+j \underline{\underline{j}}+t^{\prime} \diamond 0\right\rangle$ : Note that the coefficient of $+j$ must be posive as $L \in \mathbf{L}_{+}^{\theta}$, and the coefficients of $s$ and $s^{\prime}$ must be the same as $L \equiv L^{\prime}$, and $t \equiv t^{\prime}$ for the same reason.
We case split on $\diamond$
case $\approx:$ Then $L=s \hat{\approx}-\frac{1}{j} t$, and $L^{\prime}=s^{\prime} \hat{\approx}-\frac{1}{j} t^{\prime}$. Hence there is an instance of Rule (EF) that reduces the counterexample.
case $\geq$, or $>$ : Then there is an instance of the rule (IF) that reduces the counterexample.
case $\left\langle P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right), P\left(t_{1}^{\prime} \ldots t_{n}^{\prime}\right)\right\rangle$ Then there is an instance of the Rule (F), that reduces the counterexample.
else if $\exists t \in \operatorname{active}(L)$ that is reducible in $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$ : In this case superposition will reduce the counterexample:
We case split on the rewrite rule that is used to rewrite $t$.
case $s \rightarrow t_{1}$ where $s \in$ Atomic $^{\theta}$ : This means that there is some productive clause $D=D^{\prime} \vee s \hat{\approx} t_{1}$ with $s \triangleleft L$.
if $L \equiv s \approx t_{1}$ : Then we know by Lemma 25 that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \vDash s \approx t_{1}$, hence $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \vDash C$ which contradicts the assumption that $C$ is a counterexample. $\dashv$
else if $s \hat{\approx} t_{1} \succ L$ : Then we know by Lemma 19 that $L \equiv \approx \underline{\underline{s}} \hat{\approx} t_{2}$.
This means that there is an instance of Rule (Sup)

$$
\frac{C^{\prime} \vee s \hat{\approx} t_{2} \quad D^{\prime} \vee s \hat{\approx} t_{1}}{C^{\prime} \vee D^{\prime} \vee t_{2} \hat{\approx} t_{1}}
$$

As $D$ is productive, and $C$ is a counterexample we know by Lemma 25 that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models D^{\prime} \vee C^{\prime} \vee s \approx t_{2}$, and $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models s \hat{\approx} t_{1}$. Therefore $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models s \approx$ $t_{1} \wedge s \not \approx t_{2}$, which implies $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models t_{2} \not \approx t_{1}$, hence the conclusion is a smaller counterexample.
else: Note that either $L$ is strictly maximal or it is weakly maximal and not in $\mathbf{L}_{+}^{\theta}$, which means that Rule (Sup) is applicable. Therefore there is an instance of Rule (Sup)

$$
\frac{D^{\prime} \vee s \hat{\approx} t_{1} \quad C^{\prime} \vee L[s]}{C^{\prime} \vee D^{\prime} \vee L\left[t_{1}\right]}
$$

As $D$ is productive we know by Lemma 25 , that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \vDash D^{\prime}$. Further we already know that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models C^{\prime} \vee L[s]$, and as $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models s \approx t_{1}$ we know that also $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models L\left[t_{1}\right]$, hence the conclusion is a counterexample as well. Due to the stability under contexts (Lemma 4), we know that $L\left[t_{1}\right] \prec L[s]$. Further as $L[s] \prec s \hat{\approx} t_{1}$ we know that the conclusion is smaller than the premise, which means that superposition reduced the counterexample.
else if $+j \underline{s} \pm k \underline{s}+t^{\prime} \in C^{\prime}$ and $s$ is a max atom: Then the Rule (TF) reduces the counterexample.
else: We know that
$-\forall t \in \operatorname{active}(L) . t$ is irreducible in $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$

- $\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N} \neq C^{\prime}$
$-C$ is not productive
$-L \in \mathbf{L}_{+}^{\theta} \Rightarrow C=C^{\prime} \vee \underline{\underline{L}}$
$-L \notin \mathbf{L}_{+}^{\theta} \Rightarrow C=C^{\prime} \vee \underline{L}$
$-\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N}=\mathcal{I}_{C}^{N}$
Let's case split on $L$
case $+k \underline{\underline{s}}+t_{2} \gtrsim_{2} 0$ : As $C$ is not productive it must be the case that $\exists+$ $j \underline{\underline{s}}+t_{1} \gtrsim 10 \in C^{\prime} . s^{\prime} \equiv s$.
if $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models k t_{1}-j t_{2}>0$ : This means that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \vDash j t_{2}-k t_{1} \geq 0$. Hence there is an instance of Rule (IF)

$$
\frac{C^{\prime \prime} \vee+j s^{\prime}+t_{1} \gtrsim_{1} 0 \vee+k s+t_{2} \gtrsim_{2} 0}{C^{\prime \prime} \vee j t_{2}-k t_{1} \gtrsim_{4} 0 \vee+j s^{\prime}+t_{1} \gtrsim 1}
$$

which reduces the counterexample.
else if $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models j t_{2}-k t_{1}>0$ : This means that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models k t_{1}-j t_{2} \geq 0$ Hence there is an instance of Rule (IF)

$$
\frac{C^{\prime \prime} \vee+j s^{\prime}+t_{1} \gtrsim_{1} 0 \vee+k s+t_{2} \gtrsim_{2} 0}{C^{\prime \prime} \vee k t_{1}-j t_{2} \gtrsim_{3} 0 \vee+k s+t_{2} \gtrsim_{2} 0}
$$

which reduces the counterexample.
else $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models j t_{2}-k t_{1} \approx 0: \quad$ if $\gtrsim_{1}=\gtrsim_{2}$ : Then there is an instance of Rule (IF)

$$
\frac{C^{\prime \prime} \vee+j s^{\prime}+t_{1} \gtrsim 10 \vee+k s+t_{2} \gtrsim_{1} 0}{C^{\prime \prime} \vee k t_{1}-j t_{2}>0 \vee+k s+t_{2} \gtrsim_{2} 0}
$$

which reduces the counterexample.
else if $\gtrsim_{1}=>$, and $\gtrsim_{2}=\geq$ : Then there is an instance of Rule (IF)

$$
\frac{C^{\prime \prime} \vee+j s^{\prime}+t_{1}>0 \vee+k s+t_{2} \geq 0}{C^{\prime \prime} \vee k t_{1}-j t_{2}>0 \vee+k s+t_{2} \geq 0}
$$

which reduces the counterexample.
else if $\gtrsim_{1}=\geq$, and $\gtrsim_{2}=>$ : Then there is an instance of Rule (IF)

$$
\frac{C^{\prime \prime} \vee+j s^{\prime}+t_{1} \geq 0 \vee+k s+t_{2}>0}{C^{\prime \prime} \vee j t_{2}-k t_{1}>0 \vee+j s^{\prime}+t_{1} \geq 0}
$$

which reduces the counterexample.
case $\underline{\underline{s}} \hat{\approx} t$ : As $C$ is not productive we know that there is an $s^{\prime} \hat{\approx} u \in C^{\prime}$ such that $s^{\prime} \equiv s$, and $\mathcal{I}_{\prec C}^{N} \not \vDash t \not \approx u$. This means there is an instance of Equality Factoring (Rule (EF)) that reduces the counterexample.
case $s \approx s^{\prime}$ where $s \equiv s^{\prime}$ : Then $C$ cannot be a counterexample.
case $s \not \approx s^{\prime}$ where $s \equiv s^{\prime}$ : Then there is an instance of equality resolution (ER) that reduces the counterexample.
case $s \not \approx t$ where $s \neq t$ : As $s$ is not reducible, and $s \succ t$, and $t$ can only be reduced to smaller terms, we know that $s \downarrow \neq t \downarrow$. Hence $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models s \not \approx t$, which means $C$ cannot be a counterexample.
case $k \gtrsim 0$ where $\gtrsim \in\{>, \geq\}$ : Here we can reason in the same way as in the case where $L=k \gtrsim 0$ was not strictly maximal.
case $-k \underline{\underline{s}}+t>0$ : Note that $-k$ is negative as all positive coefficients have are being removed by termfactoring in the case before.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models-k s+t>0 & \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models-k^{\prime} s+t>0 \\
& \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models+k s-t \geq 0 \\
& \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models+k s-t>0 \| \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models+k s-t \approx 0
\end{aligned}
$$

if $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models+k s-t \approx 0$ : This is not possible as $s$ is irreducible.
else: That means that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models k l-t \geq 0$ for some $s^{\prime}>l \in \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$.
By construction of $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$ this means that there must be some productive clause $D=D^{\prime} \vee j \underline{\underline{s}}-j l \gtrsim 0$. This further means that there is an application of (FM)

$$
\frac{D^{\prime} \vee+j \underline{\underline{s^{\prime}}}-j l \gtrsim 0 \quad C^{\prime} \vee-k \underline{s}+t>0}{C^{\prime} \vee D^{\prime} \vee j t-j k l>0}
$$

As $D$ is productive, by Lemma 25 we know that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models \neg D^{\prime} \wedge j \underline{\underline{s}}-$ $j l \gtrsim 0$. Hence we know that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models C^{\prime} \vee D^{\prime}$. Further we know that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models k l-t \geq 0$, which means that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models t-k l>0$, which means that the conclusion is a counterexample.
We know that if there is some summand $k^{\prime \prime} s^{\prime \prime}$ of $t$ with $s \equiv s^{\prime}$, then $k^{\prime \prime}$ must be negative, as otherwise term factoring would be applicable, which case we already handled before.

$$
\begin{align*}
& +j s \prec-k s \\
& \text { (Property 12) } \\
& \Longrightarrow \quad+j s-j l \prec-k s  \tag{Property7}\\
& \Longrightarrow \quad+j s-j l \prec-k s+t \\
& \Longrightarrow \quad D^{\prime} \prec+j s-j l \prec-k s+t \\
& \Longrightarrow \quad D^{\prime} \vee C^{\prime} \prec-k s+t \vee C^{\prime} \\
& \text { (Property 13) }
\end{align*}
$$

Further as $s^{\prime}=\operatorname{maxAtom}\left(j s^{\prime}-j l \gtrsim 0\right)$, and due to totality (Property 2), we know that $\forall s^{\prime \prime} \in \operatorname{maxAtoms}(-k s+t>0) \cdot s^{\prime \prime} \equiv s$. This implies that maxAtoms $(-k s+t>0) \succ \operatorname{maxAtoms}(j t-j k l>0)$. This means by Lemma 16 that the conclusion is a smaller counterexample. case $-k \underline{\underline{s}}+t \geq 0$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models-k s+t \geq 0 & \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models-k s+t>0 \& \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models-k s+t \approx 0 \\
& \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models+k s-t \geq 0 \& \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \vDash-k s+t \approx 0 \\
& \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models+k s-t>0 \& \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models-k s+t \approx 0
\end{aligned}
$$

As previously means that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models k l-t \geq 0$ for some $s^{\prime}>l \in \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$, hence by construction of $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$ this means that there must be some productive clause $D=D^{\prime} \vee j s^{\prime}-j l \gtrsim 0$. If $\gtrsim=>$ then we can reason as in the case where $L=-k s+t>0$.
If $\gtrsim=\geq$ then there is an instance of $(F M \geq)$.

$$
\frac{D^{\prime} \vee+j \underline{\underline{s}}-j l \geq 0 \quad C^{\prime} \vee-k \underline{s}+t \geq 0}{C^{\prime} \vee D^{\prime} \vee j t-j k l>0 \vee-k s+t \approx 0}
$$

As $D$ is productive, by Lemma 25 we know that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models \neg D^{\prime} \wedge j s-j l \geq 0$. Hence we know that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \models C^{\prime} \vee D^{\prime}$. Further we know that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \models k l-t \geq$ 0 , which means that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \vDash j t-j k l>0$. Hence the conclusion is a counterexample.
Further we can reason as in the case where $L=-k s+t>0$ to establish that $C^{\prime} \vee D^{\prime} \vee j t-j k l>0 \prec-k s+t \geq 0$. Together with Lemma 13 we know that the conclusion is a smaller counterexample.
case $\neg P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right)$ : Then we know that $P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right) \in \mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N}$, hence there must be a productive clause $D=D^{\prime} \vee P\left(t_{1}^{\prime} \ldots t_{n}^{\prime}\right)$, with $t_{i} \equiv t_{i}^{\prime}$ for all $i$. This means that there is a resolution inference (BR), that reduces the counterexample.

$$
\frac{D^{\prime} \vee P\left(t_{1} \ldots t_{n}\right) \quad C^{\prime} \vee \neg P\left(t_{1}^{\prime} \ldots t_{n}^{\prime}\right)}{C^{\prime} \vee D^{\prime}}
$$

As $D$ is productive we know by Lemma 25 that $\mathcal{I}_{\infty}^{N} \not \vDash D^{\prime}$, hence the conclusion is a smaller counterexample.

### 5.2 ALASCA Lifting and Completeness

Variable Elimination. Theorem 4 establishes completeness of Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ for ground clauses wrt $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$. We next lift this result (and calculus) to non-ground clauses.

We introduce the concept of an unshielded variable. We say a term $t: \tau_{\mathbb{Q}}$ is a top level term of a literal $L$ if $t \in \operatorname{atoms}(L)$. We call a variable $x$ unshielded in some clause $C$ if $x$ is a top level term of a literal in $C$, and there is no literal with an atomic top level term $t[x]$, and no uninterpreted literal $L[x]$. Observe that within the Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ rules, only maximal atomic terms in sums are being used in rule applications. This means, lifting Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ to Alasca is straightforward for clauses where all maximal terms in sums are not variables. Further, due to the subterm property, if a variable is maximal in a sum then it must be unshielded. Hence, the only variables we have to deal within Alasca rule applications are unshielded ones.

The work of [39] modifies a standard saturation algorithm by integrating it with a variable elimination rule that gets rid of unshielded variables, without compromising completeness of the calculus. Based on [39] and the variable elimination rule of [3], we extend Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ with the Variable Elimination Rule (VE), as given in Fig. 6. In what follows, we show that the handling of unshielded variables in Fig. 6 can naturally be done within a standard saturation framework.

The (VE) rules replaces any clause with a set of clauses that is equivalent and does not contain unshielded variables. We assume that the clause is normalized, such that in every inequality $x$ only occurs once with a factor 1 or -1 , whereas for for equalities, $x$ only occurs with factor 1 . A simple example for the application of (VE) is the clause $a-x>0 \vee x-b>0 \vee a+b+x \geq 0$, where $x \in \mathbf{V}$, and $a, b$ are constants. By reasoning about inequalities, it is easy to see that this is equivalent to $a>x \vee a+b \geq x \vee x>b$, thus further equivalent to $a>b \vee a+b \geq b$, which illustrates the benefit of variable elimination through (VE).
Lemma 26. The conclusion of (VE) is equivalent to its premise.
Proof. We will call a rule equivalence preserving iff its premises are equivalent to its conclusion.

We will proof the fact that the rule is equivalence preserving reducing it to the same fact about a simpler rule that does not contain equalities but only inequalities, using the fact that every positive and negative equality can be defined in terms of disequalities.

So let's first consider the simplified version of the rule, where all predicate symbols of the variable are either $(>)$ or $(\geq)$

$$
\frac{C \vee \bigvee_{i \in I}\left(x+b_{i} \gtrsim i 0\right) \vee \bigvee_{j \in J}\left(-x+b_{j} \gtrsim j 0\right)}{C \vee \underset{i \in I, j \in J}{\vee}\left(b_{i}+b_{j} \gtrsim i, j 0\right)}\left(\mathrm{VE}^{*}\right)
$$

where $-\left(\gtrsim_{i}\right),\left(\gtrsim_{j}\right) \in\{(\geq),(>)\}$

$$
-\left(\gtrsim_{i, j}\right)= \begin{cases}(>) & \text { if }\left(\gtrsim_{i}\right)=\left(\gtrsim_{j}\right)=(>) \\ (\geq) & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

Lemma 27. The conclusion of the rule (VE*) is equivalent to its premise.
Proof. " $\Longrightarrow$ ") The basic idea of this part of the proof is the following. Assuming the conclusion of the rule is false, it defines a set of bounds, that must contain a value $m$. This value $m$ can then be used as an $x$ to make the assumption false as well. We will now formalize this intuition:

Suppose $M \vDash$ Hyp. In case $M \vDash C$, we're done, so let's consider $M \not \vDash C$. This means we need to show that $M \vDash \bigvee_{i \in I}\left(x+b_{i} \gtrsim_{i} 0\right) \vee \bigvee_{j \in J}\left(-x+b_{j} \gtrsim j 0\right) \Longrightarrow M \vDash$ $\underset{i \in I, j \in J}{ }\left(b_{i}+b_{j} \gtrsim_{i, j} 0\right)$

We will do that by contraposition

$$
\begin{align*}
& M \not \vDash \bigvee_{i \in I, j \in J}\left(b_{i}+b_{j} \gtrsim_{i, j} 0\right) \\
\Leftrightarrow & M \vDash \bigwedge_{i \in I, j \in J} \neg\left(b_{i}+b_{j} \gtrsim_{i, j} 0\right) \\
\Leftrightarrow & M \vDash \bigwedge_{i \in I, j \in J}\left(b_{j} \not Z_{i, j}-b_{i}\right) \\
\Leftrightarrow & M\left(b_{j}\right) \not Z_{i, j} M\left(-b_{i}\right) \tag{1}
\end{align*}
$$

Let us now find the least upper and greatest lower bounds for a value $x$ that will make $\bigvee_{i \in I}\left(x+b_{i} \gtrsim_{i} 0\right) \vee \bigvee_{j \in J}\left(-x+b_{j} \gtrsim_{j} 0\right)$ false:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
j^{-}=\operatorname{argmax}_{j \in J}\left(M\left(b_{j}\right)\right) & i^{+}=\operatorname{argmin}_{i \in I}\left(-M\left(b_{i}\right)\right) \\
b^{-}=M\left(b_{j^{-}}\right) & b^{+}=-M\left(b_{i^{+}}\right)
\end{array}
$$

Let $m$ be an arbitrary value such that

$$
m \in \begin{cases}{\left[b^{-}, b^{+}\right]} & \text {if }\left\langle\gtrsim_{j^{-}}, \gtrsim_{i+}\right\rangle \text { is }\rangle,>\rangle \\ ] b^{-}, b^{+}\right] & \text {if }\left\langle\gtrsim_{j^{-}}, \gtrsim_{i}\right\rangle \\ \text { is }\langle\geq,>\rangle \\ {\left[b^{-}, b^{+}[ \right.} & \text {if }\left\langle\gtrsim_{j^{-}}, \gtrsim_{i^{+}}\right\rangle \text {is }\langle>, \geq\rangle \\ ] b^{-}, b^{+}[ & \text {if }\left\langle\gtrsim_{j^{-}}, \gtrsim_{i^{+}}\right\rangle \text {is }\langle\geq, \geq\rangle\end{cases}
$$

Note that due to the definition of $\gtrsim_{i, j}$, and (1), the value $m$ exists: If on the one hand $(\geq) \in\left\{\left(\gtrsim_{i^{+}}\right),\left(\gtrsim_{j^{-}}\right)\right\}$then we have that $\left(\gtrsim_{i^{+}, j^{-}}\right)=(\geq)$, which means that by (1) we have that $b^{-} \nsupseteq-b^{+}$which means that $b^{-}<-b^{+}$, hence we could choose the value $\frac{b^{-}-b^{+}}{2}$. On the other hand if $(>)=\left(\gtrsim_{i+}\right)=\left(\gtrsim_{j-}\right)$, then we have $\left(\gtrsim_{i^{+}, j^{-}}\right)=(>)$, hence by (1) we know that $b^{-} \ngtr-b^{+}$, which means that $b^{-} \leq-b^{+}$, which means we can again choose the same value.

Let's show first that $M\{x \mapsto m\} \not \forall-x+b_{j} \gtrsim j 0$ for any $j \in J$. If $m \neq M\left(b_{j}\right)$ then it is strictly greater, since it is greater or equal to $b^{-}$which is the maximum
of all $M\left(b_{j}\right)$. If $m=M\left(b_{j}\right)$, then (due to the definition of $m$ ), $\gtrsim j$ must be $>$, which means that we are done because $\not \forall-b_{j}+b_{j}>0$.

Finally we need to show that $M\{x \mapsto m\} \not \forall x+b_{i} \gtrsim_{i} 0$ for any $i \in I$. This can be done analogous to the case before: If $m \neq-M\left(b_{i}\right)$ then it is strictly less, since it is less or equal to $b^{+}$which is the maximum of all $-M\left(b_{i}\right)$. If $m=-M\left(b_{i}\right)$, then (due to the definition of $m$ ), $\gtrsim_{i}$ must be $>$, which means that we are done because $\not \models-b_{j}+b_{j}>0$.
" "") The intuition here is that if conclusion of the rule is true, then must be some value $m$ within the bounds of some $-b_{i}, b_{j}$. Which means that every $x$ will either be less then this $m$, hence less than $b_{j}$, or it will be greater than this $m$, hence greater than $-b_{i}$, which means that the hypothesis is true.

Let us formalize this argument: As in the case before, if $M \vDash C$, we're done. So let's assume that $M \vDash b_{i}+b_{j} \gtrsim_{i, j} 0$ for some $\langle i, j\rangle \in I \times J$. We define $m=\frac{b_{i}+b_{j}}{2}$.
if $M(x)>m$ : Then we have that $M(x)>m \geq-b_{j}$, which means $M \vDash x+b_{j}>0$. if $M(x)<m$ : We have that $M(x)<m \leq b_{i}$, hence $M \vDash-x+b_{i}>0$.
if $M(x)=m$ : We make a case distinction base on $\gtrsim_{i}$ and $\gtrsim_{j}$ :
if $\left(\gtrsim_{i}\right)=\left(\gtrsim_{j}\right)=(>)$ : Then $\left(\gtrsim_{i, j}\right)=(>)$. This means $-M\left(b_{i}\right)<m<$ $M\left(b_{j}\right)$, which means that $M \vDash x+b_{i}>0$.
if $(\geq)=\left(\gtrsim_{i}\right)$ : Then $\left(\gtrsim_{i, j}\right)=(>)$, hence $-M\left(b_{i}\right) \leq m \leq M\left(b_{j}\right)$, which means that $M \vDash x+b_{i} \geq 0$.
if $(\geq)=\left(\gtrsim_{j}\right)$ : Then $\left(\gtrsim_{i, j}\right)=(>)$, hence $-M\left(b_{i}\right) \leq m \leq M\left(b_{j}\right)$, which means that $M \vDash-x+b_{j} \geq 0$.

Now that we have established that (VE*) is equivalence preserving we can proof it for the more general rule (VE) by reducing it to the simpler one. We first rewrite the premise of the general rule to be a disjunction of inequalities.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& C \vee \bigvee_{i \in I} x+b_{i} \gtrsim i 0 \vee \bigvee_{j \in J}-x+b_{j} \gtrsim j 0 \vee \bigvee_{k \in K} x+b_{k} \approx 0 \vee \bigvee_{l \in L} x+b_{l} \not \approx 0 \\
& \Longleftrightarrow C \vee \bigvee_{i \in I} x+b_{i} \gtrsim_{i} 0 \vee \bigvee_{j \in J}-x+b_{j} \gtrsim_{j} 0 \vee \bigvee_{k \in K} x+b_{k} \approx 0 \vee \bigvee_{l \in L} x+b_{l}>0 \vee \bigvee_{l \in L}-x-b_{l}>0 \\
& \Longleftrightarrow\binom{C \vee \bigvee_{i \in I} x+b_{i} \gtrsim i 0 \vee \bigvee_{j \in J}-x+b_{j} \gtrsim j 0 \vee \vee_{k \in K}\left(x+b_{k} \geq 0 \wedge-x-b_{k} \geq 0\right)}{\vee \bigvee_{l \in L} x+b_{l}>0 \vee \bigvee_{l \in L}-x-b_{l}>0} \\
& \Longleftrightarrow \bigwedge_{K^{+} \subseteq K}\left(\begin{array}{r}
C \vee \bigvee_{i \in I} x+b_{i} \gtrsim_{i} 0 \vee \bigvee_{j \in J}-x+b_{j} \gtrsim j 0 \vee \bigvee_{k \in K^{+}} x+b_{k} \geq 0 \vee \\
\vee \bigvee_{l \in L} x+b_{l}>0 \quad \vee \bigvee_{k \in K^{-}}-x-b_{k} \geq 0 \\
\bigvee_{l \in L}-x-b_{l}>0
\end{array}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

where $K^{-}=K \backslash K^{+}$.

Then we can apply (VE*)

which we can simplify to

where $\operatorname{pairs}(S)=\{\langle x, y\rangle \in S \times S, x \prec y\}$ for some ordering $\prec$ on $S$. Which concludes our proof.

Alasca Calculus - Non-Ground Version with Unification with Abstraction. We now define our lifted calculus Alasca, as follows. Let Alasca ${ }^{-}$be the calculus Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ being lifted for clauses without unshielded variables. We define Alasca to be Alasca ${ }^{-}$chained with the variable elimination rule. That is, the result of every rule application is simplified using (VE) as long as applicable.

Formally define Alasca $=\left\{\gamma^{(V E)} \mid \gamma \in\right.$ Alasca $\left.^{-}\right\}$, where $\circ^{*}$ and $\circ{ }^{(V E)}$ are defined as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \gamma^{(\mathrm{VE})}= \begin{cases}\gamma^{*} & \text { if the conclusion of } \gamma \text { contains an unshielded variable } \\
\gamma & \text { else }\end{cases} \\
& \left(\begin{array}{ccc}
C_{1} & \ldots & C_{n} \\
D
\end{array}\right)^{*}=\left(\begin{array}{lll}
C_{1} & \ldots & C_{n} \\
& \frac{D}{D^{\prime}}(\mathrm{VE})
\end{array}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

Theorem 5. Alasca is the lifting of a counterexample-reducing inference system for sets of clauses without unshielded variables.

Proof. We observe that by definition Alasca will never produce clauses with unshielded variables. Further by Lemma 26 it will derive sets of clauses equivalent to Alasca ${ }^{-}$. Thus the only thing to show is that in cases where Alasca ${ }^{-}$reduces a counterexample $C_{n}$ to $D$, the clause $D^{\prime}$, the result of simplifying $D$ using (VE), will be smaller than $C_{n}$ as well. As Alasca ${ }^{-}$is a lifting of Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$, only ground instances of $\mathrm{Alasca}^{-}$inferences that actually are inferences of Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ are relevant for reducing counterexamples. These inferences can only introduce unshielded variables $x$, if $x$ has been shielded by some term $s_{i}$ in a hypothesis $s_{i}$ such that $s_{i} \in \operatorname{active}\left(C_{i}\right)$. Further for such a rule the conclusion $D^{\prime}$ only contains atoms that were contained in some hypothesis before, but does not contain the maximal atom $s_{i}$ anymore. Therefore, as the literal ordering orders literals by their atoms $\mathrm{s}_{\text {safe }}$, and clauses by the multiset extension of that literal ordering, the result is also smaller than $C_{n}$.

Theorem 5 implies that Alasca is refutationally complete wrt $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$ for sets of clauses without unshielded variables. As (VE) can be used to preprocess arbitrary sets of clauses to eliminate all unshielded variables, we get the following.

Corollary 1. If $N$ is a set of clauses that is unsatisfiable with respect to $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbb{Q}}$, then $N$ can be refuted using Alasca.

We conclude this section by specifying the lifting of Alasca ${ }^{\theta}$ to get Alasca ${ }^{-}$. To this end, we use our uwa results and properties for unification with abstraction (Sect. 4). We note that using unification modulo $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$ would require us to develop an algorithmic approach that computes a complete set of unifiers modulo $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$, which is a quite challenging task both in theory and in practice. Instead, using Theorem 1 and Theorem 3, we need to only specify a canAbstract predicate that guards interpreted functions and captures $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$ within uwa. This is achieved by defining canAbstract $(s, t)$ iff any function symbol $f \in\{\operatorname{sym}(s), \operatorname{sym}(t)\}$ is an interpreted function $f \in \mathbb{Q} \cup\{+\}$. This choice of the canAbstract predicate is a slight modification of the abstraction strategy one_side_interpreted of [33]. We note that this is not the only choice for the predicate to fulfil the canAbstract properties. Consider for example the terms $f(x)+a$, and $a+b$. There is no substitution that will make these two terms equal, but our abstraction predicate introduces a constraint upon trying to unify them. In order to address this, we introduce an alternative canAbstract predicate that compares the atoms of a term, instead of only looking at the outer most symbol:

We define canAbstract $(s, t)$ iff
$-\operatorname{sym}(s)=\operatorname{sym}(t)$ is interpreted, or

- there is a variable in $\operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(s) \cup$ atoms safe $(t)$, or
$-\langle n, \dot{\{ } f \mid f(\ldots) \in A \dot{\}}\rangle={ }^{\text {wmul }}\langle m,\{f|f(\ldots) \in B \dot{\}}\rangle$,
where $\langle n, A\rangle=\operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(s),\langle m, B\rangle=\operatorname{atoms}_{\text {safe }}(t)$.


## 6 Implementation and Experiments

We implemented Alasca ${ }^{5}$ in the extension of the Vampire theorem prover [26].

[^1]| Benchmarks (\#) | Alasca | Cvc5 | Vampire | Yices | UltElim | SmtInt | VEriT | solved |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| all (6374) | $\mathbf{5 7 4 4}$ | 5626 | 5585 | 5531 | 5218 | 828 | 465 | 5988 |
| LRA (1722) | 1572 | 1401 | 1396 | $\mathbf{1 7 2 2}$ | 1469 | 623 | 89 | 1722 |
| NRA (3814) | 3800 | 3804 | 3803 | $\mathbf{3 8 0 9}$ | 3669 | 0 | 0 | 3812 |
| UFLRA (10) | $\mathbf{1 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 0}$ | 0 | 0 | $\mathbf{1 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 0}$ | 10 |
| TrianguLar (34) | $\mathbf{2 4}$ | 10 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 25 |
| Limit (280) | $\mathbf{1 0 0}$ | 90 | 81 | 0 | 80 | 0 | 90 | 100 |
| SH (514) | 238 | $\mathbf{3 1 1}$ | 282 | 0 | 0 | 195 | 270 | 319 |

Table 1. Experimental results, showing the numbers of solved problems.

Benchmarks. We evaluated the practicality of Alasca using the following six sets of benchmarks, resulting all together in 6374 examples, as listed in Table 1 and detailed next. (i) We considered all sets of benchmarks from the SMT-LIB repository $[7]$ set that involve real arithmetic and uninterpreted functions, but no other theories. These are the three benchmark sets corresponding to the LRA, NRA, and UFLRA logics in SMT-LIB. (ii) We further used Sledgehammer examples generated by [15], using the SMT-LIB syntax. From the examples of [15], we selected those benchmarks that involve real arithmetic but no other theories. We refer to this benchmark set as SH. (iii) Finally, we also created two new sets of benchmarks, Triangular, and Limit, exploiting various mathematical properties. The Triangular suite contains variations of our motivating example from Sect. 2, and thus comes with reasoning challenges about triangular inequalities and continuous functions. The Limit benchmark set is comprised of problems that combine various limit properties of real-valued functions.
Experimental Setup. We compared our implementation against the solvers from the Arith (arithmetic) division of the SMT-COMP competition 2022. These solvers, given in colums $3-8$ of Table 1, are: Cvc5 [5], Vampire [34], Yices [19], UltElim [8], SmtInt [21], and veriT [2]. We note that Vampire is run in its competition portfolio mode, which includes the work from [33]. Alasca uses the same portfolio but implements our modified version of unification with abstraction (Sect. 4), disabling the use of theory axioms relying on our new Alasca rules (Sect. 5). We ran our experiments using the SMT-COMP 2022 competition setup: based on the StarExec Iowa cluster, with a 20 minutes timeout and using 4 cores. Benchmarks, solvers and results are publicly available ${ }^{6}$.
Experimental Results. Table 1 summarizes our experimental findings and indicates the overall best performance of Alasca. For example, Alasca outperforms the two best arithmetic solvers of SMT-COMP 2022 by solving 118 more problems than Cvc5 and 159 more problems than Vampire. An interesting fact to point out here is that Vampire outperforms Alasca on the problem set SH. Looking into the results in detail revealed that some problems can be solved by Vampire by applying only one rule, like demodulation, or unit resulting resolution, the applications of which are prevented in Alasca, as literals are normalized so that the rules are not applicable anymore. For this reason believe that future

[^2]adjustments of first-order simplification rules (such as subsumption resolution and demodulation) for Alasca will further push the overall superiority of Alasca.

## 7 Conclusions and Future Work

We introduced the Alasca calculus and drastically improved the performance of superposition theorem proving on linear arithmetic. Alasca eliminates the use of theory axioms by introducing theory-specific rules such as an analogue of Fourier-Motzkin elimination. We perform unification with abstraction with a general theoretical foundation, which, together with our variable elimination rules, serves as a replacement for unification modulo theory. Our experiments show that Alasca is competitive with state-of-the-art theorem provers, solving more problems than any prover that entered the arithmetic division in SMT-COMP 2022. Future work includes designing an integer version of Alasca, developing different versions for the canAbstract predicate, and improving literal/clause selections within Alasca.

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[^0]:    ${ }^{4}$ A formal definition of $\mathcal{A}_{\text {eq }}$-compatibility is given later (See Property 3).

[^1]:    5 available at https://github.com/vprover/vampire/tree/alasca

[^2]:    ${ }^{6}$ https://www.starexec.org/starexec/secure/explore/spaces.jsp?id=535817

