Download PDFOpen PDF in browser

Computing Nash Equilibria of Unbounded Games

13 pagesPublished: June 22, 2012


Using techniques from higher-type computability theory and proof theory we extend the well-known game-theoretic technique of backward induction to finite games of unbounded length. The main application is a closed formula for calculating strategy profiles in Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium even in the case of games where the length of play is not a-priori fixed.

Keyphrases: backward induction, bar recursion, Nash equilibrium, selection functions, subgame optimal equilibrium

In: Andrei Voronkov (editor). Turing-100. The Alan Turing Centenary, vol 10, pages 53--65

BibTeX entry
  author    = {Martin Escardo and Paulo Oliva},
  title     = {Computing Nash Equilibria of Unbounded Games},
  booktitle = {Turing-100. The Alan Turing Centenary},
  editor    = {Andrei Voronkov},
  series    = {EPiC Series in Computing},
  volume    = {10},
  pages     = {53--65},
  year      = {2012},
  publisher = {EasyChair},
  bibsource = {EasyChair,},
  issn      = {2398-7340},
  url       = {},
  doi       = {10.29007/1wpl}}
Download PDFOpen PDF in browser